

THE AMERICAN WAR OF  
SECESSION, 1863

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG

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# THE AMERICAN WAR OF SECESSION


1863

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND  
GETTYSBURG

By

COLONEL P. H. DALBIAC

AUTHOR OF "A CATECHISM OF TACTICS," "HISTORY OF THE  
45TH REGIMENT," "DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH QUOTATIONS,"  
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


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
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## INTRODUCTION

THERE have been but few wars of more stirring human interest, or which will more amply repay the student of military history, than the American War of Secession. The brilliant strategical genius of a Napoleon or a Moltke, reflected in the highly regulated movements of a perfect military machine is certainly wanting ; but in its place is a something which appeals more strongly to the human side of our natures. Our sympathies go out to the men of undoubted genius like Lee and Jackson, patriotically struggling, in a cause in which they implicitly believed, for the independence of their native states, and in the face of difficulties political and military which assumed at times an almost appalling magnitude.

In the study of no other war, probably, can we find so many extremes of military capacity and incapacity, so many examples of strategic possibilities and impossibilities, or such a catalogue of tactical blunders as in the war which devastated the Eastern States of North America for a period of four years. From the brilliant talents of Lee, Grant or Jackson, down to the feeble ineptitude of Pope or Burnside, a range of study

exists both in the "how to" and the "how not to" which it would be hard to find elsewhere.

From the examination of errors we can probably learn as much or more, than from a study of exact science. The results of mistakes come home to us quickly and forcibly; and by appealing to our sympathies, and our own feeling of proneness to error, force themselves more vividly on our imaginations and memories.

A difficulty which is apt to beset the student as well as the casual reader of military history, is the difficulty, when dealing with the older Continental wars, of drawing an adequate mental picture of the actual situations of the performers in the drama. The opposing troops, themselves, their racial differences, their individual courage, discipline, intelligence, as well as the feelings which animated them, are factors of which we have some difficulty in arriving at a clear and satisfactory conception. In the American War this difficulty seems to disappear at the outset: we are able to realise, without any stretch of the imagination, the spirit which animated the rival forces; while their weak and their strong points come within our conception and our knowledge, as they were of our own race; and, though separated from us geographically, were after all our own kith and kin.

One important feature in the conduct of war is most



emphatically exemplified in the history of the American War ; and that is the necessity of giving the commander a free hand in the conduct of the campaign. Readers of military history of the Napoleonic period will remember how the Emperor's most able rival, the Archduke Charles, was hampered in all his designs by the Aulic Council in Vienna, who endeavoured to arrange the strategy of all his campaigns themselves. This control from the capital was exercised to an exaggerated extent in the War of Secession : for the first two years the campaigns were conducted from Richmond and Washington, with results that did not redound to the credit of either party.

In 1862 Lee was appointed to the Supreme Command of the Confederate armies, and the control more or less ceased ; but the support accorded to him in men and munitions was never as prompt or as ample as the circumstances demanded.

The Federal government did their duty far more fully and promptly in this latter particular ; they kept their armies well fed with reinforcements and material, but it was not until they appointed Grant to the Supreme Command, in 1864, that they relaxed the absolute control of every campaign by the War Office at Washington : a control that was productive in every instance of disastrous results.

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As a commander Hooker never showed either great ability or rapid power of decision ; but it is quite possible that his real merits may have been of a much higher order than results have shown, had he been permitted to exercise a free judgment and conduct his campaigns according to his own lights. It is notorious that he and Halleck were not on good terms, with the result that he was by no means a *persona grata* at Washington. His indecision and slowness after Lee's advance north in June were really the result of all his suggestions being negatived at Washington ; and in the end, as we know, he was compelled to throw up his command at a critical period of the campaign. The Washington authorities no doubt felt themselves justified by the result of the action at Gettysburg ; but it may probably be assumed, with a reasonable amount of certainty, that had Lee gained the success, which was at one time well within his grasp, their only way of excusing their own folly would have been to have made a scapegoat of Meade. For the moment, Meade was supported, at least he was free from interference, so far as we know ; and what was denied to Hooker was granted to him without let or hindrance, and the result was success—a success for which no credit can be given to the authorities at Washington.

Though most of the leaders of both armies had studied the art of war, and studied in the same school, the armies themselves may justly be described as consisting of amateurs. The North, it is true, had a small standing army, but its numbers were so insignificant, that they cannot even be reckoned as a leaven of the whole force. Out of nearly 800,000 men who were called to the colours during the continuance of the war, less than 25,000 were regular troops; and at no time could more than three per cent. of the Northern force in the field be reckoned as regulars.

In each state there existed a militia, whose rights were carefully guarded by legislation, whose arms were for the most part obsolete, and whose training was beneath contempt. Man for man, the Confederate soldier probably made a far better fighting machine than the Northerner. By nature and training a good shot and a horseman, he compared favourably with the townsmen and the German and Irish mercenaries which Lincoln put into the field: there was good stuff nevertheless in the Northern armies, and the war clearly demonstrated the latent fitness of the New Englander for the duties of a soldier.

Both armies took the field untrained (though in the special campaign of which we are writing the Southerners,

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at any rate, the great majority of whom had been in the field for some two years, had become veterans), and had to learn all they could of discipline and the art of war, in the rough school of war itself. How well they learned their lesson, anyone who has carefully studied the history of the war knows well. From the first they showed themselves capable of taking punishment with the patience and endurance of trained soldiers; and the enormous percentage of losses suffered by both sides without demoralisation teaches us what can be expected from armies of citizen soldiers, when called upon to do their duty in defence of their homes and the belongings which are dear to them.

Lord Wolseley, who visited Lee's army shortly after the battle of Sharpsburg, has given striking testimony to the morale and efficiency of the Confederate soldier; which would be sufficient of itself to prove how well he had learned his lesson, had we not a record of his deeds throughout four long years of incessant and fierce fighting—a record possibly sometimes hardly creditable to the leader, but never discreditable to the soldier.

It is in the fact that this war was a war of amateurs that it should appeal so strongly to us; for is not the defence of our homes in this country practically entrusted to amateurs; and what amateurs accomplished in march-

ing and fighting then, why should not amateurs accomplish, if called upon, again? We see in the story of the American War, the capabilities, the possibilities and the weaknesses of untrained soldiers; we should aim in our training of the Territorial army at emulating the two former, and avoiding the latter.

Many weak points in both armies will be apparent to the student, the majority of which are questions of organisation, equipment and other kindred matters, which concern the staffs and those higher in authority; but the one point which will come home most readily, and should be most appreciated by the ordinary reader and student, is the incompetence of the Regimental and Staff officer, which is apparent at every turn. This incompetence did not arise from any physical disability, or any lack of courage or zeal, but simply from lack of knowledge and want of training.

Lee in a letter to General Hood from Fredericksburg, dated 21st May 1863, says: "I agree with you in believing that our army would be invincible if it could be properly officered and organised. There never were such men in an army before. They will go anywhere and do anything if properly led. But there is the difficulty—proper commanders. Where can they be obtained?"

Let every young officer take this to heart, especially

those who join our Territorial forces. Let them remember that men are the same now as they were in 1863, and that their value as fighting units will be what their officers make them; that before he can teach the art of war, he must have studied it himself. The days of playing at soldiers are over, and everyone who aspires to a commission, either in the Regular or the Territorial army, takes upon himself a responsibility which his country has a right to demand he shall equip himself to bear.

The art of war is not learned by intuition, though naturally, like everything else, it comes quicker to some than to others; nor is it learned solely in the drill hall or on the barrack square; it is in his own study, by the aid of those lessons which history and the writings of those who have made special study of the art of war, that the officer must equip himself with the knowledge essential to the intelligent training of those of whom his country has entrusted him with the leadership. The trust is a sacred one, and honour and duty compel that it should be carried out with all the energy and intelligence that it demands.

Despite the advance of science, the main principles of the art of war are much, to-day, what they were a hundred years ago. Death was the same in 1863 as

it is to-day ; wounds and the privations of war infinitely worse ; and what the farmers and planters of Virginia and the States of America accomplished in the early sixties, the mechanics and clerks of England can be trained to accomplish to-day ; and regimental officers should bear in mind, that should the day ever arrive when the fate of our great Empire has to be fought out on the slopes of our southern or eastern counties, it is mainly upon their capacity or incapacity that the result will hang.

The American War affords us a striking example of the advantage of superiority in the two great essentials of infantry, shooting and marching. The Southerner by nature and training was a much better shot than the Northerner, with the result that when they came into contact he was in consequence able to strike the harder ; and by being able to outmarch his opponents, Lee was nearly always able to make up for the disparity of his numbers by striking where he chose. And it was probably largely due to these two causes that the South were able to carry on the unequal contest for so long a period ; and, had the North not possessed the command of the sea, the ultimate victory would, in all probability, not have rested where it did.

Book-learning alone, it is true, cannot make a soldier ;


but it is the foundation upon which the essentials of a good leader are built. Personality, dash, and the heaven-sent gift of leadership, are undoubtedly the qualities which count highest on the battlefield: but even the fortunate possessor of these high qualities may, nay must, frequently find himself confronted with situations in which he would be completely compromised if he had not mastered the first principles of strategy and tactics, which books alone can teach him.

We cannot think out and prepare ourselves beforehand for every situation which may arise in war; changes and unlooked-for incidents arise so frequently and so rapidly on active service that this would be impossible. It lies in our power however, by a study of the history of past wars, to acquire a definite knowledge of those situations which most commonly arise, and armed with that knowledge the capacity of the officer who possesses inherently the moral power of leadership will be considerably augmented.

The modern conditions of war, compelling a wide discrimination of force over an extended area, throw a responsibility upon the squadron, battery and company-leaders which was altogether wanting in the wars of the past, and it is to them that a general must look to deliver the tactical blow to which his strategy has led up.



This teaches us the absolute necessity of the Regimental officer being highly trained in the art of war. The Germans recognised this long ago ; and the results of their training bore fruit in the skilful leading of their company commanders in the war of 1870, which was one of the chief causes of their success. Colonel Haking, in his admirable work on the conduct of Staff Rides, puts the connection between book-learning and practice in the clearest of terms. He says : “ *Officers are apt to regard everything they read or learn from books as theory, and everything they do with troops either in peace or war as practice. There is no objection to this aspect of the matter, provided due value is attached to the theory. It should be remembered always that what is written in such books as ‘ Combined Training,’ is intended to help officers when they meet the enemy, and not merely to assist them in passing examinations for promotion. The sternest examiner, and the most difficult to please, is war ; so that officers when studying their profession should endeavour to qualify themselves for success in the great examination of war. If they do this they will find little difficulty in passing their examinations in peace time.*”



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# CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG

## CHAPTER I

### OUTLINE OF PREVIOUS EVENTS

To enter into a discussion of the political causes which led up to the War of Secession, which devastated the Eastern States of North America for a period of four years, does not lie within the scope of the present volume.

In April 1861 war was declared, the main Federal army, advancing to attack the Confederates at Bull Run, was disastrously defeated, and fled in confusion back to Washington ; but no attempt was made by the Confederates to follow up their victory. The next campaign was devised by the Federals upon a more systematic plan. The states west of the Alleghanies were to be overrun and their resources closed to the Southerners, while the extreme western states were to be altogether cut off by obtaining command of the Mississippi River ; and at the same time a large army under McClellan was to advance upon Richmond from a sea base between the James and York rivers.

In April 1862 McClellan's army was landed at Fort Monroe, and at the same time a force moved up the Shenandoah Valley. In May and June, Jackson cleared the Shenandoah Valley, joined Lee, who was facing McClellan, and the Federal army was driven back to their ships.

Again the Federals attempted an invasion of Virginia. An army collected by General Pope, consisting of detachments of the Federal army from the Shenandoah Valley, and various parts of Virginia, with a portion of McClellan's army, advanced to the Rappahannock. Jackson fell upon their communications near Manassas Station, but was nearly crushed by Pope, who turned and attacked him with great determination; but Lee succeeded in turning Pope's flank, with the result that, by the end of August, Virginia was completely cleared of the Federal forces.

Lee now carried the war into the enemy's territory, captured Harper's Ferry and invaded Maryland; but being met by overwhelmingly superior forces he was compelled to withdraw into Virginia, after narrowly escaping destruction at Sharpsburg.

The Federals did not pursue, and Lee retired to the neighbourhood of Fredericksburg on the south side of the Rappahannock, where in December 1862 he was attacked by Burnside, who had superseded McClellan in the command of the Federal forces. After a severe

struggle Burnside was heavily repulsed, and compelled to retire across the Rappahannock.

More success attended the Federal arms in the west, Grant succeeding in wresting the states of Kentucky and Tennessee from the Confederacy; but the effect was little more than local, and had but slight effect on the main theatre of war in Eastern Virginia.

The defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg closed the campaign of 1862 in Eastern Virginia: the Federal army recrossed the Rappahannock on the night of the 15th of December, evading under cover of a fierce storm the observation of the Confederate patrols; and the two armies remained throughout the winter facing each other on the opposite banks of the Rappahannock.

No operations of any importance were undertaken for some months, with the exception of a raid by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart, in rear of Burnside's army in the direction of Washington, and an attempt by Burnside in January to march his army round Lee's flank, by way of Ely's and Germanna fords, which proved abortive owing to the inclement weather and the fearful condition of the roads.

On the 26th of January, Burnside was superseded, and General Hooker was appointed to the command of the army of the Potomac.

The forces at Hooker's disposal amounted to about

120,000 men, of which about 11,000 were cavalry ; and consisted of

The I. Corps under General Reynolds  
The II. Corps under General Couch  
The III. Corps under General Sickles  
The V. Corps under General Meade  
The VI. Corps under General Sedgwick  
The XI. Corps under General Howard  
The XII. Corps under General Slocum  
And the Cavalry Corps under General Stoneman

The army occupied an exceedingly strong position on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, among the Stafford Hills. It was based upon Aquia Creek on the Potomac River, with which it was connected by a short line of railway some fifteen miles in length. The supplies were brought to Aquia Creek by water, and were consequently subject neither to interruption nor delay, and moreover were entirely safe from any movement of the enemy.

Though Hooker on assuming command thus found himself in a secure position, with practically unassailable communications, in face of an enemy barely half his numerical strength, his condition was not altogether so rosy as it appeared. His superiority in numbers was more than compensated for by inferiority in morale. Depressed with their third failure to carry the war into the heart of Virginia, the army of the North was un-

doubtedly much dispirited by their defeat at Fredericksburg. Weakened by desertion and want of discipline, their solidarity as a fighting machine had without doubt become seriously impaired.

Hooker was a man of resolution and energy, and applied himself resolutely to the task before him. Inefficient leaders were superseded, energetic measures were taken to check desertions, discipline was sternly enforced, and in the three months that elapsed before his advance Hooker succeeded in considerably raising the fighting value of his army.

The Confederate army of North Virginia, under General Lee, occupied a strongly entrenched position on the south bank of the Rappahannock, about twenty miles in length, extending from Banks' Ford on the west, to Port Royal on the east. The army was divided into two corps, the first under Longstreet occupying the left, from Banks' Ford to Hamilton Crossing; while the right half of the position, from Hamilton Crossing to Port Royal was held by the second corps, under Jackson (Stonewall Jackson). Higher up the river, and beyond the front of either army the fords and crossing-places were watched by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart, supported by Anderson's division of Longstreet's Army Corps.

Lee's lines of supply were the railway to Richmond, running nearly due south from Fredericksburg, and the

plank road running nearly due west, past Chancellorsville, a large house is the centre of dense woods, to Orange Court House, a station on the Virginia central railroad.

Events in the other theatres of war had not been so prosperous for the Confederate cause; in the west their arms had gained no material successes, and Grant was rapidly pushing on with the reduction of Vicksburg. On the Atlantic littoral the main line of communications between Wilmington and Charleston, two important Confederate ports, and Richmond, were seriously threatened by the presence of a Federal force in North Carolina. The enormous importance of these ports to the South rendered the keeping of them open almost a necessity to the existence of the Confederacy; and the possibility of communication with them being cut, so alarmed the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, that he induced Lee, early in 1863, to send Longstreet with two of his divisions to cover Richmond. Lee, sensible of the possibly serious results of thus weakening his already inadequate force, advised that Longstreet should, at least, be retained within reach of Fredericksburg, so that his services might be quickly available should necessity arise. In place of this, his divisions were sent on a useless expedition for the attack of Suffolk, 120 miles from the position on the Rappahannock. With this decision Longstreet seems to have willingly concurred.

At the commencement of April 1863, Lee's situa-



tion could scarcely be considered either a secure or an enviable one. It is true that he occupied a position from which he had already hurled back the enemy with heavy loss, that that position was strongly entrenched, that his front was covered by a broad river, and that every available crossing and ford was carefully watched, fortified and well guarded. His line stretched out for twenty miles, and in a line of such extent weak points must have existed ; moreover, his force, less than half the numerical strength of his adversary's, was inadequate, especially after he was deprived of Longstreet's divisions, to prevent the possibility of his being outflanked by the Federals. While the possibility of his striking at his adversary's communications, the most obvious counter-stroke in the event of his flank being turned, was out of the question, in face of the fact that they were securely covered by the Rappahannock ; and the great preponderance of strength on the side of Hooker would render the detachment of a force to check him, should he move against them, a simple matter.

Deficient in numbers, the South yet possessed two advantages which had to be reckoned with in the coming contest—the superior morale of her army and the genius of its commander. An army of veterans, flushed with victory and borne up with an unwavering faith in their leader, the Confederate forces were but too eager to be led again against their foes ; fortified with a certain con-

fidence that they would again march to a repetition of the victories to which Lee and Jackson had so often lead them.

Lee was not the man to submit long to a situation of inactivity, and even in his present difficult situation, the idea of falling back never seems to have occurred to him. On the contrary, we find that during the three months of inaction on the Rappahannock he was all along preparing to strike a blow at Hooker: in a letter sent by him to Jefferson Davis in April we learn that it was his intention, if Hooker had not forestalled him, to strike the first blow himself. In that letter, after referring to difficulties connected with forage and supplies, he writes, "I think it is all important that we should be able to assume the aggressive by May 1st."

Circumstances, however, dealt hardly with Lee; by the end of April sufficient stores had not been collected to enable him to move. Longstreet was still away; while two of his cavalry brigades, those under Hampton and Jenkins, which had been detached to South Carolina and the Shenandoah Valley respectively, had not rejoined.

Hooker, knowing doubtless that nearly a third of Lee's forces were absent, considered that the opportunity to strike had arrived, as soon as the cessation of the rainy weather rendered the roads passable. Urged, probably, also to action by the Government at Washington, and

the necessity of achieving something decisive before the service of his nine months' and two years' men came to a close. On the 13th April, therefore, he took the initiative, and commenced the fourth invasion of Virginia, which was destined to be shortly terminated by the crushing defeat of Chancellorsville.

## CHAPTER II

### HOOKER MOVES

HOOKER's plan of attack was simple, and in principle the fairly obvious one. His enemy was stretched out on a long line, extending for nearly twenty miles, and could not consequently be strong everywhere. He resolved therefore to make a feint of crossing the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, while with the rest of his army he crossed higher up, moved down the river on Lee's left flank, and gave him battle, should he remain, in the open country above Banks' Ford, whence the whole line of the Confederate entrenchments on the heights above Fredericksburg would be taken in reverse. At the same time his cavalry corps, under Stoneman, was to move out round Lee's left, and raid his communications; breaking up railroads and telegraphs, and intercepting his supplies.

With Hooker's overwhelming superiority in numbers, this plan seemed to offer a more than favourable prospect of success, and his intention and ambition were no doubt to place himself astride of Lee's line of retreat on Richmond in such a manner as should ensure the destruction or surrender of the entire Confederate army; while should this fail, he, doubtless, felt confident that Stone-

man's raid on the communications between Fredericksburg and Richmond could hardly fail to render it impossible for Lee to supply his army, and thus compel him to fall back from his position before Fredericksburg.

To accomplish this, Sedgwick, with three corps, was to move down the river, effect a crossing and at least contain a considerable part of the enemy's force, if he could not draw him into a general action there ; while the remaining four corps were to move up the Rappahannock, cross at Kelly's Ford, move down the right bank and reopen Banks' Ford, thus securing a line of retreat if necessary ; as well as secure communication with the other wing of the army.

The cavalry under Stoneman were to move out a fortnight in advance of the rest of the army, for the purpose of carrying out their raid on Lee's communications. Stoneman accordingly moved off on the night of the 13th April, to commence the operations ; but misfortune the first befell Hooker at the outset. A heavy storm set in which broke up the roads and made the river impassable ; and he was detained until the 28th. Hooker loth to defer his advance had moved off the V. (Meade), the XI. (Howard), and the XII. (Slocum) Corps on the previous day, seized Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th, and by the next morning had thrown the entire force, cavalry and infantry, across the river. The V. Corps moved on Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan River, the

XI. and XII. Corps took the road to Germanna Ford ; while Stoneman moved on to Culpeper, where he halted.

By way of deceiving the enemy as to his movements, Hooker left Gibbon's division of the II. Corps at Falmouth, in full view of the Confederate army.

On the same day the VI. (Sedgwick) Corps and the I. (Reynolds) Corps, under Sedgwick, were moved about four miles down the river, and bivouacked opposite Deep Run : to support them, if necessary, the III. (Sickles) Corps was held in reserve, a short distance in rear.

The next morning, under cover of a fog, Sedgwick's force laid pontoon bridges, and crossing the river were soon engaged with Jackson's outposts.

Hooker's movements came as no surprise to Lee : as early as the 21st of April, a small force of the Federals had demonstrated in the direction of Kelly's Ford ; while on the 24th, portions of two divisions had moved down the north bank of the river to Port Conway, opposite Port Royal, thrown some of their number across the river in boats, and made a considerable demonstration with the intention of inducing Lee to believe that Hooker had intentions of making a serious attempt to cross at that point. This caused no great alarm, and only induced Jackson to slightly strengthen his force in that direction.

Stuart, who was watching the fords with the Confederate cavalry on the left flank, reported to Lee, on the evening of the 28th April, that strong forces of the

enemy were moving up the Rappahannock in the direction of Kelly's Ford; and about 6.30 P.M. on the 29th Lee received definite information that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan at Ely's and Germanna fords. He at once despatched Anderson's division to Chancellorsville; while Jackson's Corps was concentrated in front of Sedgwick.

During the 30th Hooker advanced rapidly; the two brigades of Anderson's Corps watching Ely's and United States Ford fell back, and by the evening of that day the V., XI. and XII. Corps were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Chancellorsville; with the III. (Sickles) Corps, which had been recalled from supporting Sedgwick, close at hand in reserve. Anderson now fell back to Tabernacle Church, and commenced entrenching a position at that spot astride of the Plank road.

Stuart, who had fallen back before Hooker's advance, sent Fitzhugh Lee's brigade back to Todd's Tavern; and started for Fredericksburg to explain the situation to Lee; on the way he encountered a force of the Federal cavalry near Spottsylvania, which he handled somewhat severely.

The message received by Lee from art Studuring the 30th cleared up the situation; information had been gleaned from prisoners that three corps were advancing on Chancellorsville, which, coupled with the news that Anderson was falling back, made it evident

that Hooker's main attack was coming from the west, with the intention of turning the Confederate left; also that his forces were divided.

The single brigade of cavalry, under Pleasanton, which Hooker had retained with his force, was altogether inadequate to the work required of it. Hooker, possibly, thought that Stoneman's raid would draw off the bulk of the Confederate cavalry; but in this he was mistaken. Stuart retained the whole of his force, with the exception of two regiments, and struck persistently at Hooker's flank; thus obtaining the valuable information which enabled Lee to form a correct estimate of the enemy's movements. Stuart handled his cavalry throughout with consummate skill, and probably never in the course of his brilliant career did he perform better or more thoroughly efficient work than during the opening days of Hooker's advance upon Chancellorsville.

Lee, who had the advantage of interior lines, had now to settle upon his plan of action, and decide whether he should turn on Hooker or Sedgwick. The former was at the head of some 70,000 men, the latter about 35,000, while he himself could only place about 60,000 men in line of battle. At the first sight an attack on Sedgwick seemed to offer the best chance of success; Jackson at first inclined to this line of action; after reconnoitring the ground, however, he determined otherwise, and the resolution was come to, to march against Hooker. Orders



were therefore issued on the evening of the 30th to concentrate against Hooker in the direction of Chancellorsville ; while Early with about 10,000 men was left to hold Sedgwick in check, on the heights above Fredericksburg.

So far Hooker's programme had been successfully carried out. The rivers which protected the Confederate flank had been crossed without loss ; Lee's position was practically turned, and the three Federal corps were concentrated in a strong position, with another corps close at hand in support. Hooker's general order issued on the evening of the 30th, expressing his satisfaction with the results already achieved, shows that his own feelings were that victory was already practically gained, and that he was of opinion that he held Lee in the hollow of his hand. But he had already made one fatal error which was to cost him dear : he had deprived himself of the services of his cavalry, with the exception of Pleasanton's brigade, which was wholly inadequate to the purpose which was assigned to it. The Confederate cavalry was in vastly superior strength at the decisive point ; consequently he lacked the one great essential to success, ample and accurate information as to his enemy's movements. On the night of the 30th, he knew practically nothing, beyond the fact that the Confederate position above Fredericksburg was still occupied.

This lack of information, coupled possibly with his

complacent self-satisfaction with the success that had so far attended his movements, caused him to miss the golden opportunity which presented itself to him that evening. At 6 P.M. on the 30th April, his force was concentrated at Chancellorsville; there was nothing within striking distance to oppose him but Anderson's weak division, yet he made no move until 11 A.M. the following day.

A single hour's delay, when a vastly inferior enemy is receiving reinforcements or strengthening his position, is likely to be fraught with serious if not fatal consequences. Banks' Ford was within his grasp, and its immediate possession would have shortened the distance between his own force and Sedgwick's by some miles, and Lee would have been forced to fight the next day at a disadvantage; moreover, Anderson's division, by an immediate and energetic advance, might have been crushed before it could have been reinforced. Yet Hooker wasted the precious time when the prize was almost within his grasp, and nothing lay between him and success but Anderson's weak division.

Lee's energy and promptness stood out in bold relief against Hooker's dilatory course of action. Support was promptly sent to Anderson: Jackson marched off at midnight, on the 30th April, and by 8 A.M. the following morning stood in line of battle beside Anderson at Tabernacle Church, along with McLaws' division,

which had preceded him by only a few hours ; and Hooker's opportunity was gone for ever.

Stoneman, meanwhile, had moved south from Culpeper with his cavalry ; and after detaching Averell's brigade to cover his right flank, crossed the Rapidan by Morton's and Raccoon fords, and moving to Louisa Court House commenced his work of destruction. Portions of his force penetrated to within three miles of Richmond ; Hanover Junction was destroyed, a train full of Confederate wounded was captured, and considerable damage done ; but no effect whatever was produced on the general issue of the campaign, for Hooker was defeated at Chancellorsville, and in full retreat, before Lee's communications were struck ; while the havoc committed was repaired in a few days.

On the 5th, Stoneman commenced to retire, and passed Kelly's Ford again on the 8th May.

## CHAPTER III

### CHANCELLORSVILLE

*1st May*

THE country into which Hooker had plunged his army was about as unfavourable as could be imagined for the manœuvres of a large army.

A dense forest, known as the Wilderness of Spottsylvania, stretched southward from the river for some fifteen miles; and commencing some two and a half miles east of Chancellorsville spread westward for nearly twenty miles. Not only was the timber exceedingly dense, but the undergrowth and tangled scrub rendered the ground almost impassable; tracks were rare, spongy and bad; streams with boggy beds and marshy banks were frequent, while clearings were scarce and small; consequently any extended field of view or fire was almost non-existent.

The country was traversed by the Turnpike road from Fredericksburg to Germanna Ford; another road called the Plank road diverged from the Turnpike road at Chancellorsville, and running south of it, rejoined it about a mile east of Tabernacle Church. To the west-

ward another road branched off to the south-west from the Turnpike at Wilderness Church, some three miles from Chancellorsville; whence also a road ran north, dividing about a mile away; the westward fork leading to Ely's Ford, and the eastward to United States Ford; from this fork another road branched off to the eastward, known as the River road, leading to Banks' Ford. There was also a road southward from Chancellorsville, which it will be seen was thus the great centre of communication in this part of the Wilderness. An unfinished railway traversed the forest from east to west about a mile south of the Plank road.

At 11 A.M. on the 1st May, Hooker moved out to attack Lee. His intention was to pass rapidly through the Wilderness, secure the open ground about Tabernacle Church and, with his right resting on the position he had gained, to deploy for battle with his left covering Banks' Ford, and then move against the rear of the Confederate position on Marye's Hill. With this object he moved in three columns.

The V. (Meade) Corps, less Sykes' division, took the River road to the north, or left of the attack.

Sykes' division of Meade's Corps, followed by Hancock's division of Couch's Corps, took the Turnpike road in the centre. The XII. (Slocum) Corps, followed by the XI. (Howard) Corps, moved on the right by the Plank road.

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French's division of the II. (Couch) Corps moved southward to Todd's Tavern.

The III. (Sickles) Corps, which had arrived during the morning, remained at Chancellorsville as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out to the westward as far as Dowdall's Tavern.

Jackson on reaching Anderson found that he had strongly entrenched his whole front, and was occupying a good position, covering some three miles of front, from the unfinished railway near Tabernacle Church, on the left, to Motts Run, on the right. There were now assembled on the position some 45,000 men, with about 100 guns, together with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry; a force ample for the defence of the position, commanding as it did all the approaches by which the enemy must debouch from the Wilderness.

But to stand passively on the defensive was altogether foreign to Jackson's nature: he at once on his arrival ordered work on the defences to cease, and determined to move out to meet the enemy. Orders were at once given for an immediate advance on Chancellorsville. Before 11 o'clock the army was on the move. Anderson led one division on the Pike road and two on the Plank road. McLaws followed on the Pike road, Jackson moving along the Plank road on the left.

About two miles from Chancellorsville the rival forces came into collision. Anderson and Sykes met on the

Turnpike, and after a sharp fight Sykes was outflanked and compelled to fall back behind Hancock: Slocum formed on the right to support Hancock with his left resting on the Plank road; but, Jackson pushing a brigade rapidly along the unfinished railroad to turn his right, Hooker became fearful lest his right should be enveloped, and ordered a retirement on Chancellorsville.

As the enemy was obviously in great strength, Jackson followed up with great caution, the main body, well closed up, keeping to the main highways: the thick undergrowth of the forest was almost impenetrable for the infantry, and as Chancellorsville was approached the cavalry found every path and approach strongly held, and Hooker's exact position was hard to discover; a fortunate thing for Hooker, as his army was for some time heaped up in some confusion round Chancellorsville, and had Jackson made a sudden attack the results might well have proved disastrous.

Late in the afternoon the position cleared up; the resistance of the Federal skirmishers became more stubborn, and the heavy artillery fire, raking every approach, made it evident that Hooker was standing on the defensive.

Hooker's timidity seems difficult of explanation; no doubt he was hampered in every direction by the dense impenetrable thickets of the Wilderness, which broke up every formation and rendered concert of action almost

an impossibility. The Confederates no doubt suffered the same way in some measure, but they had the advantage of being better acquainted with the country. But this alone seems hardly a sufficient excuse for retiring before an inferior force, after what was after all but little more than a glorified skirmish.

Meade's column, which was never brought into action, got within sight of Banks' Ford before it was recalled : there is no doubt that it could have been usefully employed to strike the right flank of the enemy with great effect ; and the fortunes of the day might thus have been materially modified, if not entirely changed. This column retired along the River road without being molested.

However, whatever his reasons may have been, Hooker, early in the day, decided to abandon his original plan and fall back again to stand on the defensive at Chancellorsville, hoping possibly that by this means he might induce Lee to waste his strength by an attack on his entrenchments ; and that thus weakened he might fall a comparatively easy prey to Sedgwick falling on his rear.

There is some reason to think that Hooker had in his mind the possibility that he would be compelled to fall back when he marched off in the morning ; for he had ordered the ground about Chancellorsville to be thoroughly reconnoitred and entrenched, and the retiring army, though heaped up in some confusion on



first reaching Chancellorsville, was soon restored to order, and the troops took up the positions allotted to them.

The V. (Meade) Corps held the left, with its flank on the Rappahannock near Scots Dam, covering the old Mine roads.

The II. (Couch) Corps was on Meade's right, blocking the Turnpike road, with French's division reaching to a point just east of Chancellorsville.

Next came the XII. (Slocum) Corps, covering Chancellorsville, facing south.

The III. (Sickles) Corps held Hazel Grove, a large bare plateau immediately south-west of Chancellorsville, with Berry's division as a general reserve; on the extreme right echeloned along the Plank road was the XI. (Howard) Corps. The whole position, extending about six miles from flank to flank, was strongly entrenched, and batteries were posted to sweep every approach, and soon after midnight a message was sent to Sedgwick to send on the I. (Reynolds) Corps to Chancellorsville.

The position was undoubtedly strong, but had its defects. The thickets surrounding it were almost impenetrable, so that counter-attack was rendered well-nigh impossible; while ample cover was afforded to the enemy to conceal his movements, and enable him to keep secret till the last moment his point of attack. The high ground on the east, moreover, offered commanding artillery positions to the enemy, while Hooker's artillery had but

little scope ; and, last but not least, the right flank under Howard was absolutely "in the air." Hooker, sensible of this, sent a brigade of Sickles' Corps with artillery to strengthen it, but Howard, taking this for a reflection on his own capacity, refused the proffered help, and the reinforcements returned to rejoin their own corps.

Sedgwick, during the day, had been singularly inactive ; it is true that a message sent him to make a brisk demonstration did not reach him until late in the afternoon, and that it was therefore too late to make any diversion which would have had any effect on affairs at Chancellorsville. He knew, or should have known, that a large portion of the force in his front had marched against Hooker ; and he had early reports of the action in progress near Tabernacle Church, yet beyond contenting himself with engaging the outposts on his front, he made no advance to assist the movement of his chief.

Such was the state of affairs when darkness closed the scene. Lee, who had carefully examined the Federal position, had satisfied himself that it was scarcely assailable either on its left or centre ; and yet it appeared, unless Hooker should retire during the night, that the situation offered no other course but an attack. And at the same time a frontal attack on a strongly entrenched army, in superior numbers, seemed an operation too hazardous to be thought of. On the other hand the Federal army was divided, and its right wing involved in a difficult country

of which it was ignorant; and the opportunity was probably as favourable as any that was likely to recur. Before coming to any definite decision Lee ordered Stuart to reconnoitre the Federal right, where Howard was posted, to see if any vulnerable point could be found on that wing.

The result of the day's work had been wholly favourable to the Confederate army. Hooker's main force had been pressed back into the forest, and the distance between his two wings considerably increased. Yet the situation was still hazardous; greatly superior forces lay entrenched on Lee's front, and a force of upwards of 30,000 men menaced his rear.

### *2nd May*

Far into the night Jackson and Lee sat discussing the situation on the Plank road about three miles from Chancellorsville.

Once again fortune, or rather Hooker's want of foresight in sending away his cavalry, favoured Lee. Lee's superiority in cavalry gave him the power of thoroughly reconnoitring the enemy's position, and of screening his own movements.

Fitzhugh Lee, who had been sent to reconnoitre on the Federal right, rode in to Lee in the small hours of the morning of the 2nd May, and reported that the Federal right on the Plank road was completely in the air; that

it was protected by no natural obstacle, and that the breastworks thrown up for its protection faced south only ; consequently it was absolutely open to attack from the west or north-west.

Jackson at once asked permission to proceed with his own corps, make a detour through the woods and fall upon the unprotected flank of Howard's Corps. It was a startling and bold proposal, contrary to all the principles of strategy and violating one of the first rules of war. With Jackson gone, Lee's force would be divided, and he would be left with but two divisions to withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven back to Fredericksburg, or absolutely crushed. Early was still left confronting Sedgwick's Corps before Fredericksburg, and the Confederate army would thus be divided into three groups ; Jackson's 30,000 men some twelve miles away to the west ; Lee with two divisions only to oppose 70,000 Federals ; and Early ten miles away to the east opposed to double his numbers under Sedgwick. Moreover, Lee and Jackson separated might easily, in such a country, fail to act in combination, and either or both meet with disaster, which would mean nothing short of annihilation. Still, something had to be done ; Lee knew his lieutenant, and felt that in his hands the turning column would be as safe as human possibilities could make it. Besides, in the event of failure, if the worst came to the worst, it would be possible for Jackson to fall

back on Gordonsville, while it would be open to Lee to retire toward the Central Virginia Railway, where they could reunite their columns by rail, before Hooker could march across country and prevent their junction. Lee granted permission to Jackson to undertake the turning movement, and by 4 o'clock the 2nd Army Corps was under weigh.

Jackson's force, some 25,000 strong, moved off in one column, Rodes' division leading, with A. P. Hill's division in rear, while the front was covered by Fitzhugh Lee with the 5th Virginia Cavalry; the remainder of his brigade covering the flank.

Jackson moved southward along the road leading to Todd's Tavern, turning off on the cross-road to the west at Catherine Furnace, where he left a regiment of infantry, the 23rd Georgia.

In spite of every precaution Jackson's column did not get away unobserved. As early as 8 A.M., Birney, who commanded the division at Hazel Grove, reported to Hooker's headquarters the passage of a long column across a bare hill about a mile and a half from his front, whose numbers he estimated fairly accurately.

Hooker seems at once to have jumped to the conclusion that Lee was retiring, and he therefore ordered Sickles to pursue with his own corps and Pleasanton's cavalry brigade. He also sent a message to Sedgwick to the effect that Lee was in full retreat and that "Sickles was

among his trains," and ordering him to cross the river and fall on Lee's rear.

At the same time it seems also to have occurred to Hooker that there was some possibility of the column which had been reported, being destined to move round to his right flank and attack Howard; for to provide against this contingency he despatched a message to Howard at 9.30 A.M., informing him of the fact, and suggesting that he should take measures to secure his right flank. Of this message Howard appears to have taken not the smallest notice.

About 11 A.M. a battery was ordered into action on Hazel Grove, which caused some slight confusion in the Confederate ranks and compelled their trains to move by another and more sheltered road.

About 1 A.M. Sickles started with Birney's division and some artillery; Whipple's division being on his left, and Barlow's brigade of the XI. (Howard) Corps protecting his right. After some delays he crossed Lewis Creek and reached the road by which Jackson was marching at Catherine Furnace. Here he surrounded and captured the 23rd Georgia Regiment.

Jackson sent back Archer's and Thomas' brigades with an artillery battalion, who manœuvred against Sickles' front while Anderson struck him in flank. This checked Sickles' advance and he remained inactive for the rest of the day in the neighbourhood of the Furnace.

Jackson, moving rapidly forward, struck the Brock road about two miles west of the Federal flank, and turning north reached the Plank road about 2 P.M. Here he was met by Fitzhugh Lee, and the two rode to a point close at hand, whence the whole of Howard's position lay open to their view.

Jackson immediately pushed on Rodes' division to the Turnpike road, which it struck near Luckett's Farm at about 4 P.M. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by the Stonewall brigade, was placed a short distance down the Plank road to mask the march of the column : and Jackson formed up his 25,000 men in line of battle, unobserved, within a mile of the enemy's flank.

At 2 A.M. Hooker had sent for the I. (Reynolds) Corps to join him at once by way of United States Ford ; but beyond despatching the force under Sickles, already mentioned, to Catherine Furnace, he stood passively on the defensive all day. Lee on the other hand was not idle ; no sooner was Jackson fairly *en route* than he began to demonstrate vigorously, with the 10,000 men of Anderson's and McLaws' divisions at his disposal, against Hooker's left and centre. Meade's position was heavily cannonaded ; Couch and Slocum were attacked, and Hancock, whose position was somewhat in advance of the main line, had to fight hard to hold his ground.

Just about the time that Jackson's attack was due, Lee made a furious attack on Meade at the other end of

the line ; this attack was repulsed, but served to distract Hooker's attention from the real point of danger on the other flank. The critical moment was come ; Lee and Jackson were separated by six miles of well-nigh impenetrable forest, with an overwhelming force of the enemy between them—what was to be the issue ? To Jackson, looking down on the undefended Federal flank before him, that issue can never for a moment have been in doubt ; but to Lee the afternoon hours of 2nd May must have been passed in nervous anxiety. But Jackson had never played him false, and never less so than on the present occasion.

Jackson, who had formed up his force with Rodes' division leading, Colston's division about two hundred yards in rear, and A. P. Hill, partly in line and partly in column in the third line, gave the order to advance about 6 P.M. With a wild yell the Confederate forces rushed forward to the attack, the pickets were borne away in the rush and, though the small force under General von Gilsa checked the rush for a few seconds, within ten minutes the Federal right brigade was flying in panic. Near Talley's Farm another brigade essayed to stop the Confederate rush ; attacked in front and flank they were quickly cut to pieces ; and what remained of them joined the crowd of fugitives now hastening back past the Wilderness Church. Howard did what he could to save the situation, Bushbeck's brigade was formed in the rifle pits on the ridge near Dowdall's Tavern, behind which he



tried to rally the fugitives; his artillery was formed up on the left, and for a short time he checked Jackson's tumultuous rush; but Colston's division reinforced Rodes, and the position was soon carried. Bushbeck's brigade retreating in fairly good order among the flying crowd streaming in wild disorder to the rear past Hooker's headquarters. The Confederates paused; it was 7 o'clock and twilight was falling; their wild and rapid advance had caused some confusion in their ranks; divisions were mixed, and regiments were irretrievably mingled. Jackson, however, would admit of no halt, forward was the word. He was within a mile and a half of the Federal centre, in the rear of their entrenchments, and almost within his grasp lay their line of retreat, the road to United States Ford.

Hooker's dream of security had a rather rude awakening. The wild rush of fugitives past Chancellorsville was his first intimation of what had occurred. A line of fresh troops had to be formed at once, for Jackson was sweeping everything before him. To find an adequate force was no easy task, as the whole line was engaged; Meade, Slocum and Couch were all being vigorously attacked. The only available division, Berry's, was at once formed across the Plank road; but the utmost he could do was to hold his position in the valley opposite Fairview. Some batteries of the XI. Corps were stopped and formed behind him, and for a time the enemy was checked.

Riding forward in the thick undergrowth, in the darkness, about this time Jackson was accidentally shot by some of his own men, and the confusion thus caused at the critical moment was of immense advantage to the Federals. Hill, who alone knew his intentions, had also been wounded and it was some little time before Stuart, who succeeded to the command, reached the front.

The respite which Jackson's fall had accorded the Federals was used to the utmost by Hooker. The I. (Reynolds) Corps, which had arrived on the Rappahannock, was hurried across the river and secured the road to the White House, which embraced Hooker's line of retreat; and Averell's division of cavalry arrived at Ely's Ford.

Meanwhile Sickles with his 10,000 men had hastened back from Catherine Furnace, brushing aside Anderson, who was powerless to impede him, and reoccupied Hazel Grove, where Pleasanton was still in action with his guns. Hooker sent orders to Sickles to assault the right flank of the enemy, and check his advance. At midnight the command moved against the enemy, and a desperate conflict ensued in the moonlight, though with no material advantage to the Federals, beyond the reoccupation of some few of the works Howard had lost. This vigorous counter-stroke, though, had the effect of making Stuart apprehensive, and checked any further immediate operations on his part.

Both sides now rested on their arms, and prepared to renew the conflict at daylight.

*3rd May*

Hooker, though much discouraged by the route of the XI. Corps, determined to continue the battle, for which purpose he decided to contract his lines, bringing them nearer to Chancellorsville.

Hazel Grove was practically the key of the position, as it commanded Chancellorsville, where all the roads met, and which it was consequently vital to Hooker to hold; Pleasanton spent the night in fortifying it, but without avail, as Hooker, apparently unaware of its importance, withdrew Sickles into a new position near Chancellorsville early in the morning.

This was a fatal mistake on Hooker's part; with the Hazel Grove salient in his possession, he kept the two wings of the Confederate army divided by a distance of upwards of two miles; and the opportunity of holding one portion of the Confederate army in check while the other was overwhelmed was lost.

Hooker sent the remains of the XI. (Howard) Corps to the extreme left of the line to reorganise, where they were sheltered behind strong earthworks, with their left resting on the river. The V. (Meade) Corps moved a little to their right somewhat nearer Chancellorsville; the 2nd (Couch) Corps was on their right with Hancock's

division thrown somewhat forward on the Turnpike road. The XII. (Slocum) Corps still faced south, immediately in front of Chancellorsville; the III. (Sickles) Corps fell back into a new position, on a low ridge facing west, astride of the Plank road, and at right angles to the XII. Corps, while the I. (Reynolds) Corps took up a position on the right rear, covering the Ely's Ford road.

Late on the previous evening Hooker had sent orders to Sedgwick's Corps, which he seems to have been under the impression was still at Falmouth, to cross the river, drive back Early, move along the Plank road, and take Lee's forces in reverse.

Lee had given orders to renew the combat in the morning; Stuart at once saw the immense importance of the position at Hazel Grove, and, seizing it without delay, placed thirty guns in position there, which played with fatal effect upon Chancellorsville, and enfiladed the crest occupied by Slocum's Corps. At the same time a desperate attack was made on Sickles' Corps at Fairview; for a time his troops held their line and a desperate combat ensued; but the artillery fire from Hazel Grove was too much for them, and they eventually had to fall back. Simultaneously a desperate attack was made by McLaws and Anderson on the Federal positions to the south and east.

Nothing could resist Stuart's attack, and by the afternoon the last Federal position to the west was

carried, and Anderson and Stuart were able to join hands.

The whole Federal line now melted away, with the exception of Hancock, who kept up the contest for some time, but being taken in reverse he too had to join the retirement. The new line taken up by the Union army was in the form of a semicircle, with its flanks resting on the Rappahannock and Rapidan respectively, and its centre at Bullock's House about a mile north of Chancellorsville.

Stuart and Anderson took up a position south of the Plank road, facing north, which they placed in a state of defence. Pursuit was impossible as the woods on either side of the Plank had taken fire, and the raging flames for a time made an impassible barrier between the two armies.

Sedgwick with the VI. Corps started after midnight on the 2nd May, and by 3 A.M. had reached Fredericksburg; here, at daylight, he was joined by Gibbon's division which had laid bridges and crossed the river. He then proceeded to assault the positions held by Ewell above Fredericksburg; Gibbon was directed to advance on the right and turn the left flank of the Confederates; Newton was ordered to demonstrate against their centre while Howe assaulted the right; but it was not till nearly 11 A.M. that the heights on the right of Hazel Run were carried; this enabled Sedgwick to take the remaining

positions held by Ewell's force in reverse ; and in a short time the heights, which Burnside with his whole army had in vain struggled to capture, were in Sedgwick's hands, while Early's force was divided and thrown off in different directions towards Richmond.

Sedgwick was now in a position to continue his advance straight down the Plank road, and had he done so affairs might have been different for the Union army.

The same fatal procrastination which had dogged Hooker's footsteps seemed to cling to Sedgwick ; it was fully 3 P.M. before he moved off. This gave time for Ewell's scattered forces to collect, and for Wilcox's brigade of his (Ewell's) division to take up a strong position near Guest's House ; and his artillery opening fire, Sedgwick was still further delayed.

To Lee, waiting to commence his attack on the second Federal position of Chancellorsville, was brought the news, before midday, that Sedgwick had broken through and carried Marye's Hill. McLaws' division was at once despatched to Salem Church ; the remainder of his force remaining to hold Hooker in check. Sedgwick attached McLaws fiercely and nearly succeeded in breaking through, but a vigorous counter-stroke drove back his leading division in disorder. Early meanwhile had reassembled his divisions near Cox's House, and made arrangements to retake the Fredericksburg heights, and demonstrate against Sedgwick's rear.

The struggle continued till darkness, the Confederates holding their ground, and Sedgwick, no longer confident of forcing his way through, bivouacked on the ground he held. Meanwhile General Benham of the Engineers had thrown two bridges across the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam, about a mile below Banks' Ford, to afford Sedgwick a line of retreat in case of disaster, and to render his communication with Hooker easier and quicker.

The results of the communications, however, brought small comfort to Sedgwick, who was informed by Hooker that he must rely on himself, as he could be afforded no assistance from headquarters.

#### *4th May*

Early on the morning of the 4th May, Lee himself, with Anderson's three remaining brigades, marched off to reinforce Early; leaving only the corps which Jackson had commanded, now under Stuart, in front of Hooker. Sedgwick with about 20,000 men had fortified a position covering Banks' Ford; his right, resting on the river a little above Banks' Ford, consisted of Newton's division; it stretched to the Plank road between the Toll House and Salem Church, facing west, and was confronted by the Confederate division under McLaws. His centre faced south, under Banks', and ran parallel to and a little south of the Plank road, where he was opposed by Anderson's division. Howe, facing east, was confronted by Early,

who had regained the Fredericksburg heights, while Gibbon's brigade occupied the town of Fredericksburg. The Federal position was strong, and Lee spent the greater part of the day in reconnoitring, so that it was nearly 4 P.M. before he gave the order for attack.

Meanwhile Hooker did nothing. With nearly 60,000 men, of whom possibly half were fresh, in a strongly fortified position, and confronted by less than 20,000 men, worn out with fatigue, within seven miles of his subordinate, upon whose success the whole issue of the campaign depended, he attempted nothing more than a feeble and ineffectual reconnaissance, and left Sedgwick to extricate himself as best he could.

As early as 11 A.M. Sedgwick had again communicated the state of affairs to Hooker, and requested his active assistance. In reply, he was directed not to attack unless Hooker did the same ; in consequence he made no move, and all was quiet until about 4 P.M., when an attempt was made by Early to turn Howe's left, which, being promptly met, failed.

At about 6 P.M. Lee gave orders for a general attack on Sedgwick's line, which, stretching for some six miles, was somewhat extensive for the force at his disposal for its defence. The attack was pressed with vigour and Sedgwick, assailed in front and flanks, and with no help coming from Hooker, was quickly compelled to give ground.



The strife was only ended by darkness, and resulted in Sedgwick being driven back to a new position, covering the bridges nearer the river; from which, under cover of the darkness intensified by a thick fog which spread over the lower ground, he made good his retreat across the Rappahannock during the night.

Hooker called a council of war on the evening of the 4th May, and, although the opinion of the council was on the whole opposed to a retreat, he determined to retire. Aided by a fearful storm which broke over the Wilderness on the 5th of May, and precluded movements across country, he put his forces in motion on the evening of that day, and by the following morning was safely across the river, and on the road to his old camp on the hills opposite Fredericksburg, leaving behind him all his killed and wounded, amounting to some 13,000, 14 guns and 20,000 stand of arms—as well as his reputation. Sedgwick's force had lost nearly 5000 men in addition.

Lee's patrols finding, on the morning of the 6th, that the enemy had escaped, Lee shortly returned to his old position above Fredericksburg. His losses in men had amounted to over 13,000 in the four days' fighting; but greater than all was the loss of Jackson, who died of his wounds not long after, a loss that could never be replaced in the Confederate army. By no one was this loss felt more than by Lee, who wrote subsequently:

"Any victory would be dear at such a price. I know not how to replace him"; and it is reputed that in sending a message to Jackson he said: "You have lost your left arm but I have lost my right."

## CHAPTER IV

### SOME REFLECTIONS

THUS ended Hooker's invasion of Virginia, and in little more than a week after setting out, in full confidence of crushing Lee, he was back in his cantonments, with his numbers appreciably diminished by heavy losses, and the morale of his army broken by defeat.

It seems almost incomprehensible that any general with such overwhelming numerical superiority, and with everything in his favour up to a certain point, could have eventually so signally failed. And yet it was so.

The movement by which Hooker reached Chancellorsville, and by which the Confederate position before Fredericksburg was absolutely turned, was well conceived and almost brilliantly carried out. In three days his force covered forty-six miles over bad roads, crossed two difficult rivers, and 70,000 men were massed in rear of Lee's lines.

It may be urged that the delay to Stoneman's cavalry, by which the original plan of his raid preceding the movements of the army by fourteen days was frustrated, made a very serious difference to the execution of Hooker's intentions. It is possible, of course, that with his line of

communications cut, and his army short of supplies, Lee would have been compelled to fall back, or at least detach his own cavalry to drive off Stoneman, and re-establish his communications with Richmond. Hooker may have argued that this would be the natural result of his arrangements, and that he would therefore not be under the disadvantage of meeting Lee on inferior terms, as regarded his cavalry, at the decisive point. But, as we know, this did not prove to be the case. Lee was not the man to be led aside from the true principle of striking the heaviest blows at the decisive point, and his total disregard of Stoneman's raid would probably have been the same whenever it occurred.

This was Hooker's initial error, and its effects dogged him fatally throughout the short campaign. No doubt he reckoned upon great results from Stoneman's achievements, but he quite forgot that Pleasanton's brigade, which was all that he retained of his cavalry, would be totally incapable, in the face of Stuart's cavalry corps, of either adequately concealing his own movements or discovering those of his enemy. Had he kept his cavalry at hand, he would at least have been upon equal terms with his adversary in the first great essential of all military operations—ample and accurate information.

Once at Chancellorsville, Hooker should have pressed his advantage home without delay. Fortune is a fickle jade, and missed opportunities do not often present them-

selves again. The halt at Chancellorsville was the first step in his downward course. Had the march been continued for even one hour, or at worst resumed at daylight, his army would have got well clear of the tangled fastnesses of the Wilderness without meeting any formidable opposition ; and once clear would have been in a position where its great superiority of numbers must have told. No doubt the scantiness of his information went far towards compelling a halt—his initial error coming home to roost for the first time—but, whether this were so or not, it is hard to imagine the frame of mind which would preclude a commander from hastening on to get clear of such a place as the Wilderness, where manœuvring was well-nigh impossible, when excellent ground for the development of his full strength lay within two miles of him. Had his troops been tired some valid excuse might be urged ; but this was not so, and his decision is, therefore, the more inexplicable.

The result of this halt had its consequences in the feeble action of the following day, 1st May. With the exception of Meade's Corps, which followed the River road and was never in action, the Federal army never got clear of the Wilderness. Hooker's lack of information, and the impossibility of intercommunication and mutual support between his columns in the impenetrable underwood of the forest, coupled with the fact that his balloons reported large columns of the enemy moving towards

Chancellorsville, made him fearful for his right flank. Some prisoners taken by Sedgwick had also declared that Lee had been reinforced by Hood's and Pickett's divisions; and as Sedgwick also reported that there was no diminution of the force in his front, Hooker had strong grounds for believing the report to be true; and therefore his determination to retire and stand on the defensive at Chancellorsville may be regarded as excusable. To have attacked vigorously the advancing Confederates, especially as Meade was in a position to fall heavily on their right flank, would have been the bolder and the better method, as this sudden retirement without apparent cause must have had a discouraging effect on his troops; but in retiring, as he did, he probably only did what many another general would have done in the same position as himself, in ignorance of the numbers of the enemy in front of him and of his probable intentions.

An earlier start in the morning, or a continuance of the march the previous evening, would have largely cleared matters up for him, but it was too late now to rectify his error.

Standing on the defensive at Chancellorsville, his chickens again came home to roost. With Stoneman's cavalry at hand, every track and avenue through the forest might have been securely watched, and ample notice given of any turning movement; in addition to which Lee would have been unable to thoroughly re-

connoitre his position. As it was he was helpless ; from no part of his position did the view extend for more than a few hundred yards, and the paths and tracks which traversed the Wilderness, though bad, were passable for troops and well known to Lee ; consequently he had to await attack ignorant of the movements of the enemy, and not knowing at which point the blow would fall, buoyed up with the hope that no weak points existed in his line. Truly, somewhat of a fool's paradise, considering that Lee's superiority in cavalry, and better knowledge of the country, enabled him to reconnoitre the whole position thoroughly, and to discover the weak point whence the whole line was eventually turned. For the disaster to Howard's Corps, on his right, Hooker can by no means be held entirely free from blame. That he was sensible of the weakness of this flank is clearly shown by his ordering Graham's brigade of Sickles' Corps to reinforce Howard on the evening of the 1st May ; and again, after Jackson's Corps had been discovered making their flank movement on the following morning, he despatched a message telling Howard of what had been seen and warning him to secure his position. It is, however, hard to believe that a general realising what promised to be the point of the decisive attack should be held free from blame for neglecting to satisfy himself personally that his orders had been effectually carried out, and that every measure had been taken to secure the threatened point.

Yet, after sending this message, Hooker took no steps to discover what was happening on his right ; and the first information brought to him of any events in that quarter was the flight of the fugitives from Howard's Corps, past his own headquarters.

The only excuse that can reasonably be made for him is that he had unbounded faith in Howard ; if so it was a sad example of misplaced confidence.

For Howard, himself, excuse of any sort is impossible. The rout of his corps was possible only through the grossest neglect of the most elementary of military precautions. He had refused reinforcements the previous evening, and he neglected Hooker's orders on the 2nd May ; then, to crown all, when Jackson halted, after his toilsome march, for upwards of two hours in open ground within two miles of his lines, he was in total ignorance of the fact. A single patrol sent a mile up the road would have discovered the whole movement, and given him ample time to have strengthened his position, or at least form up in line of battle ; as it was many of his troops, when the enemy was actually upon them, were engaged in the ordinary routine of camp life—cooking, killing cattle and drawing rations.

Howard in his report endeavoured to excuse himself by saying : "*Though constantly threatened and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to mass a large force, whose exact whereabouts*



*neither patrols, reconnaissances nor scouts ascertained."* Truly "Qui s'excuse s'accuse"; he here admits that he was constantly apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet he neglected the precaution of even a single picket on his unprotected right flank, the presence of which would have been sufficient to prevent the disaster. Did he suppose that Jackson would run such a risk, and spend the whole day on a laborious march, merely to fritter away his men in a frontal attack on a line of entrenchments? Indeed "*Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*"

But all was not necessarily lost with the rout of the XI. Corps; the prompt action of Pleasanton and Sickles and the fall of Jackson stayed the pursuit. On Sunday morning Hooker's position was but little, if any, worse than it had been before. What lost the day was the abandonment of Hazel Grove, a further crowning act of folly for which it is impossible to find excuse.

Hazel Grove was the key of Hooker's position; from it his lines were enfiladed, and while it was in his possession communication between the two wings of the Confederate army was well-nigh impossible. As long as he retained it, the junction of Stuart and Anderson could not be effected.

It is not possible to conceive that he could have been in ignorance of its value. Could a general who had occupied a position for two days and nights remain in

ignorance of the key of that position when it lay not more than a mile from his own headquarters? Moreover its value, if unknown to Hooker, was well known to Sickles and Pleasanton, who had entrenched the plateau on the night of the 2nd May.

It is perhaps just to Hooker to mention that, on the morning of the 3rd May, he was injured by a cannon-ball striking a pillar of the Chancellorsville House against which he was leaning; and he was compelled to hand over command for a time to Couch. This may account for the subsequent half-hearted defence, but when he selected his position, and made his dispositions, he was uninjured and in full use of his faculties; and the value of Hazel Grove should have been fully apparent to him from the first.

The solution seems more probably to lie in the opinion that Hooker was so unnerved by the disaster to his flank that he had made up his mind during the night of the 2nd May to retire to his second position nearer the river, covering his line of retreat, and the fight of the 3rd May was intended to be no more than a rearguard action, from the first, to cover his retirement. This idea is somewhat borne out by the fact that he had upwards of 30,000 fresh troops, whom he never brought into action. What would have been the effect had Hooker retained Hazel Grove and thrown his fresh troops on Stuart's exhausted 20,000 men there can probably be no two opinions about.

One of the most prominent features which must strike the student was the absolute failure of Hooker to bring about any co-operation between the two wings of his army, separated as they were by not more than a day's march. Staff work was never the strong point in either of the armies during the war ; but the arrangements made by Hooker's staff must have been even more execrable than usual, in this history of indifferent staff work, to have produced such an absolute want of co-operation as occurred on this occasion.

There have been other Hookers, and many a campaign has been frittered away by generals who have allowed themselves to be led away from their original purpose by minor events ; and whose power of decision, like Hooker's, has been inadequate to meet at once a change of plans necessitated by unexpected developments on the part of the enemy ; or the power of rapidly remedying the results of a check or a local reverse.

Hooker set forth with the idea that Lee would await him on the heights of Fredericksburg, and fall an easy prey with his works taken in reverse ; or at any rate that, finding his position turned, he would be compelled to retire on Richmond. Lee, unfortunately, did not play according to Hooker's rules ; he left his position, but, instead of retiring, advanced to meet him. Hooker, astonished and unnerved, fell back and stood on the defensive, expecting, doubtless, that Lee would waste his

forces in frontal attacks upon his, Hooker's, entrenchments. Lee refused to acquiesce in this pleasant little arrangement, he turned Hooker's flank instead. Hooker, frightened, made a show of resistance and fled, when in reality he still had the game more or less in his own hands. Such in brief is the essence of the campaign.

For Lee, Chancellorsville was a great tactical triumph, but it bore no lasting fruit. True, Virginia was saved from invasion, and the Federal army no doubt much shaken in morale ; but it had no material effect on the future of the war.

Yet at no time from 30th April to 5th May was Lee's position other than critical.

At the head of barely 60,000 men, he stood on his position at Fredericksburg on the 30th April, with a force of some 30,000 men on his front, and 70,000 men, within seven miles of his lines, supported by another corps nearly 30,000 strong, on his left rear—a situation sufficiently serious to make a general pause and consider. He was compelled to attack, with but little apparent prospect of success ; or it was open to him to fall back towards Richmond, and take up a new position. The latter course would have occurred probably to nine generals out of ten ; but Lee was there to prevent the invasion of Virginia, and the two strongest points of generalship were inherent in him : he decided rapidly where to strike, and he struck hard. By turning rapidly

on Hooker he achieved, with some ease, the first necessity which the situation compelled : he kept Hooker and Sedgwick as far apart as possible. In front of Hooker's lines at Chancellorsville the situation demanded another rapid decision ; there was no time to wait or deliberate. Sedgwick might advance at any moment, brush aside Early's small force, and Lee would have been crushed between the upper and the nether mill stones. It was still open to him to fall back ; the only alternative to which was to at once attack Hooker ; with the probable result that a frontal attack on his entrenchments would, after failure and heavy loss, compel him to fall back after all, or in his weakened state leave him an easy prey either to a vigorous counter-attack or to Sedgwick when he did arrive.

Here Jackson came to Lee's aid, and proposed to turn Hooker's right, which Stuart, who served Lee well, had reported as being in the air.

It was an enormous risk to take ; it was putting everything to the hazard of a last throw ; but the situation demanded it.

If Jackson failed it spelled disaster, and probably complete disaster, for Lee.

Throughout the 2nd May the position of the Confederate army was more than critical ; its existence hung upon a thread. What might have happened had Howard possessed any of the natural instincts of a soldier needs

no explanation. Lee and Jackson were separated at 4 P.M. by some eight miles, with no means of communication, and with the whole of Hooker's force between them ; but the determination of Jackson, aided by the apathetic imbecility of Howard, prevailed. Hooker's right wing was crushed, and before dark the interval between Lee and Jackson was reduced to less than three miles. The tension was relieved, but the situation was not yet altogether saved. True, Sedgwick had not moved, that gave Lee more breathing time, but Hooker was unshaken in his main position.

In the moment of victory Jackson fell, and he left his victory incomplete. Had he accomplished what he intended and got across Hooker's line of retreat, near White House, the campaign might have ended that night disastrously for the army of the Potomac. But as no one knew of Jackson's intention the confusion caused by his fall left things much as they were ; and Lee's situation was still hazardous, with the two wings of his army separated, and a large portion of Hooker's force still interposed between them.

Lee, undaunted, struck his hardest again at daylight, and Hooker played into his hands by abandoning Hazel Grove. Hooker fell back and by the evening Lee was comparatively secure.

Still all danger was not yet passed ; Hooker had fresh troops which he might bring into action, and on the

following day Sedgwick moved, carried the position above Fredericksburg, and was within an ace of breaking through near Salem Church. Had Hooker moved in conjunction with Sedgwick, Lee would have had to fight for existence, with troops that must have been well-nigh worn out. Fortunately Hooker was played out, and the defeat of Sedgwick, who was left unsupported, became a comparatively easy matter.

Lee's tactical success was well deserved and complete. He had played the bold game and won; he knew his own mind and never swerved one instant from his purpose; but it was do or die from the beginning, and but for the vacillation, lack of decision and foolish errors of his opponent things might have been very different.

It is more than probable that Lee and Jackson had accurately taken Hooker's measure before they started, and felt that they were justified in taking every risk which the critical nature of the situation demanded. Nothing succeeds like success; but had affairs gone differently it is more than probable that Lee would have been subjected to as much adverse criticism as Hooker.

The performances of Jackson's Corps, from the point of view of the powers of human endurance, are worth noting. They marched off from their position on the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg at midnight on the 30th April; they reached Anderson's position near Tabernacle Church at 8 A.M. on the 1st May. At 10.30

A.M. they moved off again, fought till dark ; moved off again at 4 A.M. the following morning, marched sixteen miles over the rough tracks of the Wilderness. They commenced their attack on Howard at 6 P.M. and fought desperately till past midnight : at daylight the next morning fighting recommenced and continued till the afternoon. This means that for four days they were marching and fighting almost continuously, except for broken periods amounting in all to about twelve hours—no bad performance when we consider that even the short periods of rest must have been seriously broken into by outpost and other necessary duties.

Lee had saved Virginia from invasion, but at the expense of 13,000 such troops and his greatest and most trusted leader—Stonewall Jackson ; and, great as were the moral and material results of the victory, the price paid for them in the death of his great lieutenant was all too dear ; and the disasters which led slowly on to the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy may be truly said to have commenced with his death.



## CHAPTER V

### AFTER CHANCELLORSVILLE

A PERIOD of rest and recuperation was necessary to both armies after the struggle at Chancellorsville, and for a few weeks no movements of any importance took place. During this period Longstreet's two divisions, which had been operating in the neighbourhood of Suffolk, rejoined Lee at Fredericksburg.

Political considerations began to weigh rather heavily at this time with both sides. In the North some difficulty was being experienced in raising the necessary levies to supply the normal casualties of war, and to fill the places of the time-expired men, who were leaving the army in considerable numbers. The "Copperheads" or anti-war party were strong and noisy; and men are not easily obtained voluntarily to join a beaten army. President Lincoln and his administration had an anxious time, and it was only by great determination and serious effort that Hooker was kept supplied with reinforcements.

The government of the Confederate States was confronted with even greater difficulties and more pressing anxieties. The whole of the South was rejoicing at Lee's victories; but those victories were gained at an

enormous expense of life, which Jefferson Davis knew he could never replace. The Confederate Government was limited in its resources both as regards men and means, and it was evident that, without some external help, a prolonged defensive war could only end in exhausting the Seceding states before what they were fighting for—independence—could be obtained. The command of the sea was in the hands of the North, and beyond what the states could themselves produce, material and munitions could only be obtained from abroad, by the somewhat risky system of blockade-running.

The situation in the Western States, moreover, was alarming; Vicksburg was hard pressed, and it was evident that, unless some important effort could be made, it must soon fall, and with its surrender the Federal fleet would soon regain possession of the Mississippi River, with the result that supplies from the Western States would be cut off.

It was essential to strike a heavy blow somewhere; but how and where? Hooker's army was still strong in numbers, spite of the recruiting difficulty in the North; far too strong to tempt Lee to follow them up and assail Hooker in his position north of the Rappahannock.

Lee must either advance or fall back; the present position was a species of stale-mate which could not long endure.

Longstreet was in favour of Lee's retiring on Richmond,

and detaching his (Longstreet's) corps, to join General Joseph Johnson, who was at Jackson, Missouri, with about 20,000 men; the combined force then to advance, reinforce Bragg in Tennessee, march against Rosecrans, and pressing on into Ohio compel the abandonment of the siege of Vicksburg, where Pemberton was at his last gasp. Lee at the same time retiring on Richmond would place himself in the centre of his supplies there, and draw the Union army far away from their base.

The weak points of this plan are at once apparent: in the first place, though the distance over which the combined forces of Longstreet and Johnson would have had to move was geographically less than that over which any reinforcements to Rosecrans would have to move, the possession of far superior railroad and water communication by the latter would have enabled him to get up reinforcements long before the Confederate forces could have attacked him; and at worst he could have fallen back to the Ohio without sacrificing any position of importance.

In the second place, to have fallen back on Richmond would have disheartened the people of the South, as well as adversely affecting the morale of the army; and though it is true that it would have drawn the Federal army far from its base, yet, having the command of the sea, it would have been in their power to remedy this by

establishing a new base much nearer the scene of action, as Grant did a year later on the James River.

Lee rejected this plan, and adopted the truer and bolder principle of striking at the enemy on his own territory, and determined to relieve the pressure on Vicksburg in the West, by striking a blow in the heart of the Northern States in the East.

Political reasons, doubtless, weighed nearly as heavily with Lee as military ones in coming to this decision. The agents of the Confederate Government abroad urged that, if Lee could once establish his army firmly on Northern Territory, England would acknowledge the independence of the South, which would enable loans to be raised on Confederate securities ; while the Confederate spies in the Northern States buoyed up their President with reports that a Confederate invasion would probably be followed by outbreaks in the large cities, which would render it impossible to find reinforcements for the Federal forces in the field.

Lee's intention was to move with his whole force, making a detour round, and out of sight of, the Federal army under Hooker, and reach the line of the Susquehanna. Should he succeed in doing so he would be able to subsist his army in the Northern States, which would relieve the Confederate Government of considerable strain and anxiety ; break up the Northern and Western communications of Washington, threaten the big cities

of the North, and probably cause the Federal commander to divide his forces to protect important points, or else to uncover Baltimore and Washington. Moreover, he hoped opportunity would occur to strike the divisions of the Union army in detail, or to receive its attack in a strong defensive position.

No doubt Lee's strongest desire was to strike such a heavy blow as would bring the war to a close by drawing Hooker out to some spot where action would be decisive, and thus ensure the permanent triumph of the Confederacy. This could only be done by invading the North.

Before setting out Lee reorganised his army into three corps :

The 1st Corps under General Longstreet.

The 2nd (Jackson's old corps) Corps under General Ewell.

The 3rd Corps under General A. P. Hill.

Each corps consisted of 3 divisions, and 1 battalion of artillery (16 to 18 guns) was assigned to each division, and 1 or more battalions of reserve artillery to each corps.

In all he had 15 battalions of artillery, comprising about 250 guns.

The Cavalry Corps, consisting of 5 brigades, remained under Stuart.

The army of invasion consisted in all of about 75,000 men, of whom 10,000 were cavalry.

The forces which the Union Government could place in the field to oppose Lee consisted of some 40,000 men in and about Washington; 12,000 men under Milroy in the Shenandoah Valley, and about 110,000 men under Hooker on the Rappahannock.

Hooker was still in his old cantonments, facing Fredericksburg, with the main body of his cavalry about Warrenton and Catlett's Station, under Pleasanton; Stoneman having been displaced from the command.

The country thus destined to be the theatre of the struggle was the region lying north of the Rappahannock and east of the Shenandoah rivers; and is intersected by the Potomac River, running in a south-easterly direction from its junction with the Shenandoah River at Harper's Ferry to Washington. Along the western side are two ranges of mountains, the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run or Catoclin Mountains about fifteen miles east of the Blue Ridge; their general course is from north-east to south-west; they are pierced by numerous passes, or gaps as they are called, most of which, though practicable for troops, are easily defended, and thus capable of being converted into efficient military obstacles. Between the two ranges lies the Loudon Valley, while the Shenandoah Valley lies to the westward of the Blue Mountains. The Potomac River traverses the Blue Mountains at Harper's Ferry, and the Catoclin Mountains at Point of Rocks.

The general nature of the country is undulating and

somewhat wooded, with very close undergrowth constituting a very considerable obstacle to the movements of troops.

The principal roads of the district run for the most part in a general north-westerly to south-westerly line, following the valleys of the Potomac and its tributaries ; the roads running north and south, except in the Shenandoah Valley, are nearly all bad, narrow and tortuous, always difficult and often impassable after heavy rains. Below Point of Rocks the Potomac is rarely fordable, while above Harper's Ferry fords are numerous and practicable.

Lee had the choice of three routes for his march north ; the most direct, or most easterly, route by Bull Run ; the roads up the Loudon Valley ; or the longest and most westerly route by the Shenandoah Valley.

It is said that Lee's first intention was to move by way of the Loudon Valley directly on Washington. This would have had the effect probably of drawing Hooker and inducing him to attack, and Lee would have had the opportunity of bringing him to battle at an early date. To accomplish this it would have been necessary for his cavalry to hold back the Federal cavalry and form a screen to his movements, which it is said they found impossible after the battle of Brandywine, and that Lee was consequently compelled to change his plans and move by the Shenandoah Valley.

It is more probable that he always intended to move by the latter route. The roads by the eastern route were very bad, while those through the Shenandoah Valley were excellent. The Shenandoah Valley too was a rich agricultural region, and could provide considerable supplies for his troops, but above all the range of mountains on his right would constitute a most efficient screen to conceal his movements from the enemy. For his left flank in the northward march he had nothing to fear.

Towards the end of May, Hooker learned from his spies that the enemy was undoubtedly about to make a move of some kind ; and the idea became prevalent that it was Lee's intention to attempt an invasion of the Union territory. Hooker proposed in this case to cross the river, overwhelm any containing force which Lee might have left, intercept Lee's communications with Richmond and follow him up as he advanced North. This plan, however, did not find favour with the authorities at Washington, who refused to sanction it ; the idea of Lee's army being interposed between Washington and the army of the Potomac was more than their nerves could stand. Hooker, therefore, remained awaiting developments.



## CHAPTER VI

### LEE'S ADVANCE

ON the 2nd June the two armies lay practically in the same positions they had occupied before the Chancellorsville Campaign. The fords of the Upper Rappahannock were watched by Stuart's cavalry, the main body of which was bivouacked between Culpepper Court House and Brandy Station; Hooker's cavalry were massed in the neighbourhood of Warrenton.

Lee's first objective was Culpepper Court House, whence two systems of roads diverge, one in a north-easterly direction leading to Warrenton, Manassas and Alexandria; the other to the north and north-west leading up to the gaps over the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley. On the 3rd June, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's Corps started for Culpepper, and on the following day Ewell's Corps followed. These movements were observed by Hooker, who ordered Sedgwick to bridge the river three miles below Fredericksburg, cross over and ascertain the movements of the enemy. On the 5th Sedgwick threw Howe's division across the river; some skirmishing ensued, and Sedgwick reported, as


the result of his reconnoissance, that the enemy still held their old positions in force.

Lee, by the 8th, had concentrated Ewell's and Longstreet's Corps, together with his cavalry at Culpepper; leaving A. P. Hill's Corps to watch the enemy's movements at Fredericksburg, with orders to resist any advance it should make, and should Hooker retire to follow the other corps to Culpepper.

Hooker, who had detached his V. Corps to cover the crossings of the river between United States and Banks' fords, resolved on the 7th, if possible, to clear up the situation; and accordingly ordered Pleasanton to make a reconnoissance with all his available force in the direction of Culpepper; to assist him two brigades of infantry were attached to his force.

Pleasanton was called upon to ascertain whether the Confederate army was on the march between Fredericksburg and Culpepper; whether any or all of their force had reached Culpepper, and whether any troops were in motion west of Culpepper, and if so in what direction. He knew Stuart was in force between Brandy Station and Culpepper, and to obtain the required information it was necessary for him to drive back or penetrate Stuart's screen.

Pleasanton to achieve his purpose divided his command into three columns; the first, consisting of Buford's division, supported by Ames' infantry brigade and which he



CAVALRY ACTION AT BRANDY STATION

himself accompanied, was to cross the Rappahannock at Beverley Ford and move by St James' Church and Lee's House to Brandy Station. The second and third, composed of Gregg's and Duffié's divisions and Russell's infantry brigade, moved together across the river at Kellysville to the crossing of Mountain Run near Stone's House; at this point Gregg's division branched off to Brandy Station past Mount Dumpling; while Duffié's division took the road to the left to Stevensburg, to reconnoitre the main road leading from Fredericksburg to Culpepper Court House. This was a mistake, which probably cost the Federals the victory; a few patrols would have sufficed to carry out the reconnaissance of the road, instead of a whole brigade, whose presence in the contest was essential to a successful issue of Pleasanton's scheme.

Stuart's pickets watching the Beverley Ford were surprised, and driven hurriedly back upon the main body who were advancing from Brandy Station upon Beverley Ford. The opposing forces came into contact near St James' Church, and the fight soon became hot, though neither side seemed inclined to push matters to the length of a decisive attack.

Gregg's division now came into action on Stuart's flank, and matters became somewhat serious for the Confederates. Had Gregg and Duffié not parted company, Stuart's situation would have been more than

serious. As it was he proved quite equal to the occasion : keeping Buford's division busy with the dismounted men of one brigade, he hastily drew off his other brigade and moved at a gallop to Brandy Station to engage Gregg. The fight continued for nearly the whole day ; Robertson's brigade, which Stuart had left at Fleetwood Hill in reserve with a battery, was charged by the Federals and driven back to Brandy Station with the loss of their guns. Stuart, however, reappeared at the critical moment, and a desperate *mêlée* ensued, in which the Confederates eventually asserted their superiority, and, on Lee sending support to Stuart, Pleasanton drew off, leaving behind him the guns which he had captured. Duffié only reached the scene of action so late as to be able to make no impression on the fortunes of the day.

Pleasanton gained little or no reliable information as to the strength or movements of the Confederate infantry columns about Culpepper. Some despatches, however, were taken from which it was inferred that Lee's army was on its way to the Shenandoah Valley ; though even as late as the 21st June there seems to have been some doubt in Hooker's mind as to what really was Lee's purpose.

In this encounter Stuart was undoubtedly taken by surprise in a way one would not have expected from such a cavalry leader, and had Pleasanton used his opportunities with the same skill and vigour as was shown by

Stuart, there is little doubt that the latter would have suffered a serious blow.

Though the movement of the Federal cavalry had not been fruitful in its intended results—the acquiring of authentic information as to the movements of the enemy—it had an important result in the new confidence it inspired among them; they had held their own for some time against the renowned cavalry of the South; and McClennan, in his “Campaign of Stuart’s Cavalry,” says in an account of the engagement at Brandy Station: “One result of incalculable importance certainly did follow the battle—it *made* the Federal cavalry. Up to this time confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and their commanders which enabled them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battlefields of June, July and October.”

On the 10th Lee moved Ewell’s Corps up to Flint Hill, on the road to Chester Gap, on his way to the Shenandoah Valley. Milroy, the commander of the Union force of some 12,000 in the valley, was warned from Washington on the 11th to withdraw his stores and ammunition from Winchester to Harper’s Ferry; he remonstrated and expressed his ability to hold his own against any force likely to be sent against him. On the 12th his scouts reported a considerable force of the enemy at Cedarville, but he seems to have had no idea that there was any

probability of an entire corps being in front of him, as no information had been sent to him that Lee's army had moved from Fredericksburg. Doubtless, in common fairness, he should have been informed of Lee's probable movements in his direction, but that can hardly be held sufficient excuse to acquit him from all blame for the way in which he allowed himself to be surprised; a general in the field can scarcely expect his reconnaissance work to be done for him by headquarters!

On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions direct on Winchester, detaching Rodes' division to Berryville. McReynolds, commanding the Federal brigade at that place, having timely warning of this move, was enabled to retire safely to Winchester. Rodes, having captured Berryville, moved on to Summit Point. On the night of the 13th Milroy learned for the first time, from a Confederate prisoner, that he was confronted by the whole of Ewell's Corps.

On the 14th Ewell attacked Milroy and carried the outer defences of Winchester, enveloping his force; Rodes, meantime, moved on and invested Martinsburg; while Imboden's cavalry moved on to Romney to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railway to prevent any reinforcements being sent to Milroy.

During the night Milroy abandoned his artillery and stores, and attempted to escape, but encountered

Johnson's division, losing 4000 prisoners, the remainder of his force being practically dispersed.

The 12,000 Union troops occupying the Shenandoah Valley were thus disposed of for the rest of the campaign. Twenty-eight guns, a huge quantity of stores, and nearly 6000 prisoners were taken, with a loss to Ewell of only 270 in killed and wounded. The Shenandoah Valley was thus cleared of Federal troops, and its great highway opened for Lee's advance.

Lee's column was now stretched out to a dangerous length, offering a golden opportunity to a more adventurous opponent than Hooker. Jenkins' cavalry brigade was at Williamsport on the Potomac; Rodes' division at Martinsburg; Ewell with two divisions north of Winchester; Longstreet was at Culpepper, with Stuart's cavalry between him and Manassas in close observation of Hooker, and A. P. Hill was still in front of Fredericksburg.

On the 13th June Hooker commenced to leave his position and move northward. He apparently determined not to be drawn away from the defence of Washington, and his plan was to move parallel to Lee's advance, and strike at his communications on the first possible opportunity. Having the interior line this time, he had everything in his favour, but with his preponderance of force his tactics might, with advantage, have been of a somewhat less Fabian nature.



On the 13th he moved Reynolds with the I. Corps, now commanded by General Doubleday, VI. (Sedgwick) Corps and XI. (Howard) Corps to Bealeton and Catlett's Station, and concentrated all his cavalry at Warrenton, and by the 15th his army was arranged in two lines ; the first under Reynolds occupying the line between Herndon's Station and Manassas Junction, the III. (Sickles) Corps at Manassas. The second line, comprising the II. (Hancock) Corps, the V. (Sykes) Corps and the XII. (Williams) Corps, occupied a line extending from Fairfax Court House due south to the Occoquam. About this time he received a reinforcement of one brigade of infantry, and Stahl's cavalry division of about 6000 men.

As soon as Hooker's retirement was evident, A. P. Hill left his position before Fredericksburg and joined Lee at Culpepper. On the 15th Lee, though he had no intention of entering the country between Warrenton and Fairfax, with a view to drawing Hooker, if possible, sent Longstreet's Corps up the Loudon Valley to threaten Leesburg, with orders to return west when that was accomplished by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.

To cover this move, which was within easy striking distance of Hooker's force, Stuart was ordered to move out and mask the movement, on Longstreet's right flank. Stuart, in consequence, at once occupied Thoroughfare and Aldie Gaps, the two passes through the Bull Run Mountains.

On the 17th Stuart's force was disposed as follows :—Mumford's brigade between Middleburg and Aldie ; with his pickets pushed forward to the eastern slope of the mountains ; Robertson's brigade at Middleburg, and Chambliss' brigade at Thoroughfare Gap, from which it was removed to Middleburg on the following day.

On the 17th Hooker sent Pleasanton to the neighbourhood of Aldie, with orders to push through the Gap, and ascertain what was proceeding in the Loudon Valley. Pleasanton took with him Buford's and Gregg's divisions, and detached Duffié with one regiment to move through Thoroughfare Gap, and advance up the west side of the mountains to Middleburg.

A sanguinary contest ensued, which ended in Pleasanton obtaining possession of Aldie Gap ; Duffié, however, was unfortunate ; he drove in Stuart's outposts and reached the outskirts of Middleburg, where he camped ; but at seven o'clock the next morning he was attacked by Robertson's brigade, and compelled to retire, and during his retreat he fell foul of Chambliss' brigade and his force was captured.

Fighting continued in the Loudon Valley until the 22nd, when Pleasanton retired and rejoined the army of the Potomac. In the series of encounters he had achieved considerable success, and had succeeded in reaching the base of the Blue Ridge near Snicker's Gap ;

and was able to inform Hooker that the mass of Lee's infantry was undoubtedly moving northward through the Shenandoah Valley, though he does not seem to have gained any detailed information of Longstreet's movements.

Hooker now moved forward and occupied the passes of the Bull Run Mountains, and by the 22nd his army was in the following positions :—

The XII. Corps at Leesburg, supported by the XI. on Goose Creek between Leesburg and Aldie.

The V. Corps near Aldie, with the II. Corps a few miles to the south ; the III. Corps being in support at Gum Springs.

The I. Corps was at Guildford, in rear of the XI. and XII. Corps.

Meantime Lee continued his march ; on the day following his encounter with Milroy, Ewell crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown ; Jenkins' cavalry being ordered to Chambersburg to obtain supplies and gain information. Ewell then moved on through Sharpsburg to Hagerstown ; whence he sent Rodes and Johnson's divisions *via* Chambersburg to Carlisle ; and Early's division to York through Gettysburg. Carlisle was occupied on the 27th, and York on the 28th.

Longstreet retired from the Loudon Valley and, entering the Shenandoah Valley by Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 25th

and 26th, and moved on through Chambersburg to Fayetteville, where he arrived on the 27th June.

A. P. Hill left Culpepper on the 18th June, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 24th, and marched through Boonsborough to Fayetteville, which he reached on the same day as Longstreet.

Lee had thus succeeded in transferring the seat of war from Virginia to the heart of Pennsylvania, and placing his army in a commanding position with no army of the enemy in sight. He had marched completely round the Union army, and left his line of communication with Virginia so exposed as apparently to invite Hooker to get astride of it.

In the country he occupied he found abundance of subsistence and forage for his troops; and found nothing to oppose him in the direction of Philadelphia and New York but the State militia.

Hooker, finding on the 25th that Lee was transferring the whole of his army across the Potomac, did the same with the Union army; and on the 26th, having crossed the river, he established his headquarters at Frederick.

The XI. Corps was placed in position at Boonsborough; the I. Corps at Middletown, supported by the III. Corps; the three corps under Reynolds were thrown out towards the enemy. The bulk of the cavalry was at Frederick, with Buford's division holding the passes of South Mountain.

There was still a Federal garrison of 10,000 men under French at Harper's Ferry, and Hooker, considering it was useless to keep this force in a state of passive defence, applied to Washington for permission to use it in conjunction with Slocum's Corps to act directly against Lee's communications. The authorities at Washington, however, absolutely refused to withdraw the garrison from Harper's Ferry, and Hooker, taking umbrage at this refusal, complained that he was thwarted in all his plans, and sent in the resignation of his command. This was accepted, and General Meade was appointed to the command of the army of the Potomac in his place.

## CHAPTER VII

### MOVEMENTS OF THE CAVALRY

THROUGHOUT the movement of his army northward down the Shenandoah Valley, and on into Pennsylvania, it was Lee's intention that his cavalry should maintain their position on his right flank. On the 23rd June, Lee issued an order to Stuart ordering him to cross the Potomac, and move on and feel the right of Ewell's Corps; to either effect the crossing at Shepherdstown, keeping to the right and rear of Longstreet, or, if he thought he could do so "without hindrance," to cross the Potomac below Hooker, and, passing round between his force and Washington, to join the right of the Confederate advance in Pennsylvania.

Lee's army at this time was marching in a long column, the head of which was in Pennsylvania and the rear still in the Shenandoah Valley, while separated from Lee by only the Blue Ridge and the Loudon and Catocin Valleys was the army of the enemy.

Stuart had then to decide upon his course of action, and the latter course was the one he favoured, and upon which he acted.

Though it doubtless adversely affected the result of

the campaign, in much the same way as, though perhaps to a lesser degree than, Hooker's error in parting with his cavalry during the late campaign at Chancellorsville, there is much to be said in favour of Stuart's selection of this line of action. The distance by this route to York was no greater than by the route taken by the infantry ; the roads were fair and practicable, and what possibly weighed most in Stuart's mind was the probability of producing something akin to a panic in Washington and the great cities of the east. The effect on the Government at Washington, when they discovered the presence of a cavalry corps interposed between the city and the army of the Potomac, was more than likely to produce feelings which might induce conflicting orders to, and interference with, the movements and intentions of the Union commander.

To successfully accomplish his task, it would be necessary for him to evade or pass through the Federal army, then concentrating in the neighbourhood of Frederick, and to avoid any delay, which would in itself be fatal to the result of his expedition.

Stuart selected three brigades to accompany him, those of Fitz Lee, Hampton and Chambliss. Robertson's and Jones' brigades were left on the right and rear of Lee's advancing infantry.

On the night of the 24th the three brigades assembled secretly at Salem.

His intention was to move directly from Bull Run Mountain to the Potomac, passing to the west of Centreville, and between the corps of the Federal army, and to cross the Potomac during the night of the 25th in advance of the enemy.

With this intention he moved off at 1 A.M. on the 25th to Haymarket, where, unfortunately, he encountered Hancock's Corps of the army of the Potomac; in fact all the corps of the Union army were at this moment in motion in the direction of the river.

This compelled a long detour by Buckland Mills to avoid collision with them; on the 26th he reach Fairfax Court House, and on the 27th Dranesville; and during the night the difficult passage of the Potomac was safely accomplished at Rowser's Ford; and on the morning of the 28th June his force stood on the Maryland shore, with the entire Union army interposed between them and Lee.

During the 28th he pushed on to Rockville, on the road from Washington to Frederick, about fifteen miles from the former. Here he captured a train of 125 waggons, laden with supplies for the Federal army.

At dawn on the 29th, after a rapid night march, Stuart struck the Baltimore and Ohio Railway near Hood's Mill, where a portion of the track was torn up, and a bridge at Sykesville burned. This accomplished, he pressed on and reached Westminster at 5 P.M. the same day, with men and horses fairly tired out.



When Stuart marched off, as we have before noted, he left Robertson's and Jones' brigades to cover the rear and flank of Lee's army. The orders left them by Stuart were of a most explicit nature<sup>1</sup>; they were ordered to cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps; to watch and harass the enemy, and let nothing escape their observation. After the enemy retired their orders were, having left sufficient pickets in the mountains, to withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah Valley, and, leaving a detachment to watch Harper's Ferry, to follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.

When Stuart marched off the Union army was still south of the Potomac, while Lee was away north in Pennsylvania; therefore it was still in the power of the Union commander to move to the west into the Shenandoah Valley and place himself across Lee's line of communication.

The main object of Stuart's orders to Robertson was to make his dispositions of such a nature that he would have timely information of any move of this character on the part of the Federal forces. This order compelled a line of vedettes some thirty miles in length; and its strict observance apparently carried Robertson altogether out of touch with Lee's army. At any rate the result which actually ensued was that Lee was deprived of the use of his cavalry at the very moment when he most

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Appendix C.

required it ; and in consequence was wholly in the dark as to the movements of the enemy at the most important moment of the campaign. One can hardly blame Robertson ; he may have shown some lack of initiative, and his conception of what was required of him may have been somewhat weak ; but he carried out his orders literally and faithfully according to his own lights, and for the failure to make the proper use of these two brigades Lee himself must be held responsible.

On 30th June Robertson marched to Martinsburg, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport the following day, and on the 2nd July he reached Chambersburg and arrived at Fairfield on the 3rd, by which time the campaign had been decided on the field of Gettysburg.

On the 28th June Meade detached Kilpatrick's cavalry division to the east for the purpose of intercepting Stuart ; he moved that day to Littlestone, seven miles from Hanover. Gregg's division also moved off the same morning to head off Stuart at Westminster, but owing to the roads being blocked by marching infantry and trains he did not succeed in reaching his destination until Stuart had passed.

Stuart's information seems to have been much better than Kilpatrick's, for while he was well aware of Kilpatrick's movements, his own seem to have been quite unknown to that general.

On the morning of the 30th Stuart marched off for

York. Chambliss moved in advance, followed by the long waggon train, with Hampton's brigade in rear; Fitz Lee moved on the left, which was the exposed flank.

Kilpatrick, who had marched for Hanover on the same morning, practically crossed the line of Stuart's advance, with the result that his rearguard was attacked by Chambliss near Hanover. The Confederate column was long, and much encumbered with the captured train; it consequently required some time to deploy, with the result that their attack was beaten off after a stiff encounter by Farnsworth who commanded Kilpatrick's rearguard. Kilpatrick then formed up his whole force, but did not assume the offensive. Stuart confronted him, but withdrew in the evening and resumed his march *via* Jefferson on York, where he hoped to find Ewell. As a matter of fact he passed during his march within seven miles of Early's column on its way back to Gettysburg, and neither knew the other was near. Had they effected a junction, a result might have ensued which would have largely affected the fortunes of the campaign. This was bad luck for Stuart, as it would have saved him a long and fruitless march; but he had had his good luck in the morning, as Kilpatrick had undoubtedly failed to take advantage of a great opportunity. It was Kilpatrick's duty to have known before he camped on the night of the 29th whether Stuart had passed the point on the Hanover-Westminster road which his own line of

march would cross ; with that knowledge he would have been able to attack Stuart at great advantage : Stuart's command was worn out with a week's hard marching, and was stretched out to a dangerous length, protecting the train of captured waggons over a mile in length ; an energetic attack must have, at least, compelled the abandonment by Stuart of the captured train ; and he would probably have been unable to escape without very heavy loss, even if his command were not entirely broken up.

Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle, which he found occupied by the Federal troops, and hearing that Lee was concentrating at Gettysburg he turned back in that direction and reached Hunterstown on the morning of the 2nd July, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions.

Kilpatrick, who had lost touch, marched on to Heidlersburg, when he turned and marched back towards Gettysburg. At Hunterstown he encountered Hampton's brigade of Stuart's force, and a sharp encounter ensued which lasted all day. On the following day Hampton withdrew and joined Stuart's main body, which reached Gettysburg on the evening of the 2nd July.

There is such a halo of romance round this bold and brilliantly executed raid of Stuart's that, in our admiration of his skill and daring, we are rather apt to lose sight

of its real effect, and to overlook the strategic shortcomings of the whole transaction.

From the point of view which regards it merely as a performance, separated even from its own immediate results, we cannot but admire the brilliancy of execution with which he successfully eluded all the columns sent against him, and the skill with which he eluded the vigilance of the Federal army. The consternation he created in Washington and the big towns of the east was great, almost bordering on panic, but the material damage he effected, beyond cutting wires and breaking the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, was not appreciable. True, he captured a Federal convoy, but its loss was not felt by the army of the Potomac, which was probably in no way affected in its movements, by his daring ride.

On the other hand he exhausted his men and horses by his long, tedious and useless march, in which no information of any value to Lee was gained ; and he deprived that general of his services when they were most required.

Lee was left in much the same position as Hooker had been at Chancellorsville ; the Federal cavalry was strong and active, and had the field practically to themselves ; and Lee was in consequence left without information of the movements and intentions of the Federal army, at a moment when such information was absolutely vital to the consummation of his plans.

Things might have been different had Stuart been

able to carry out his original intention of crossing the Potomac in advance of the Federal army; had he succeeded in this he would have been in a position to cover Lee's flank, provide him with information, and sweep back the screen of the Federal cavalry, which was covering the movements of their own forces so effectually. Unfortunately, however, as we know, the Federal columns were on the move too early for him, and his encounter with Hancock's column on the morning of the 25th had compelled him to make the detour which led him round the rear of the army of the Potomac.

Small events have great effects, especially in war; and that mightiest of all factors in the game, time, often upsets the best-laid schemes. A few hours would have given Stuart the opportunity of crossing the Potomac where and how he intended; and who can say whether it was not these few hours that sealed the fate of the Confederacy.

While affairs were proceeding thus in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the authorities at Washington prepared a raid on Lee's communications in Virginia. General Dix, who commanded the Union forces at Fort Monroe, received orders to move on Richmond, at this time only weakly defended. The troops were landed at Yorktown and sent on to White House. On the 13th General Getty, with a column of about 7000 men, moved to Hanover Junction to destroy the bridge over the

Anna ; while another column, 5000 strong, under General Keys, moved out to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy. On the 15th June Keys' column was within fifteen miles of Richmond, causing considerable perturbation in the minds of the Confederate Government, who hastily called out the Militia, and concentrated men for the defence of the city from the garrisons of South Carolina.

This raid, however, in no way affected affairs in the real theatre of war, and beyond the capture of General W. H. F. Lee, who had been wounded at the battle of Brandy Station, by the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and the breaking up of a few miles of railway and some bridges, nothing was accomplished ; and by the end of the month the whole force had returned to White House.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCENTRATION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES

UPON assuming command General Meade at once gave orders for a concentration of the whole of the Federal forces in the neighbourhood of Frederick. All idea of striking against Lee's communications was abandoned ; Slocum, who had been sent to Harper's Ferry, together with the original garrison of that place, were brought in ; and the intention was arrived at to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia if he moved north, or to cover Baltimore and Washington should he turn in that direction.

On the 28th the whole Federal force was concentrated about Frederick :

The XII. (Williams) Corps was at Berlin on the Potomac.

The I. (Doubleday) Corps and the XI. (Howard) Corps were at Middletown.

The II. (Hancock) Corps, the III. (Sickles) Corps and the V. (Sykes) Corps were at Frederick.

The cavalry was disposed as follows :—Buford in the Catoctin Valley, beyond Middletown, on the Frederick and Hagerstown road ; Gregg on the right on the Little



Monocacy ; and Kilpatrick on the Monocacy a few miles north of Frederick.

The Confederate army on the same date was disposed as follows :—Ewell's Corps occupied Carlisle and York ; Longstreet was at Chambersburg, and A. P. Hill's Corps was round Fayetteville.

Before advancing, Meade was anxious to ascertain whether the Cumberland Valley was occupied by the enemy ; with this purpose Buford was sent forward rapidly on the morning of the 29th, through Turner's Gap into the Cumberland Valley. Entering the valley he turned north, passed through Cavetown and Ringold and camped at Fountain Dale. Pursuing his march the following morning, he passed through Fairfield in the direction of Gettysburg, but encountering a portion of Hill's Corps he withdrew in the direction of Emmetsburg, and reported the presence of a considerable force of Confederate infantry to General Reynolds.

Meade, meantime, advanced with the intention of pushing forward to the line of Pipe Creek.

On the evening of the 29th his army was disposed as follows :—

The I. and XI. Corps at Emmetsburg, the III. and XII. Corps at Middleburg, the V. Corps at Taneytown, the II. Corps at Unionstown and the VI. Corps at New Windsor.

On the following day he advanced his army still nearer

the Susquehanna, and on the evening of the 30th he stood on a line from Westminster to Marsh Creek on the Emmetsburg-Gettysburg road. The I. Corps occupied Marsh Creek, the II. and III. Corps were at Taneytown, the V. Corps at Union Mills, the XII. Corps at Frizzelburg and the VI. Corps at Westminster. The I. Corps had been ordered to Gettysburg, but was halted by General Reynolds at Marsh Creek, as the enemy were reported by Buford in the neighbourhood of Gettysburg, as has been before mentioned.

On the afternoon of the 30th, Buford, under orders from Pleasanton, moved on again and occupied Gettysburg. At once appreciating the importance of the position, he advanced about a mile beyond the town, and deployed his division to secure it, across the Chambersburg road. Satisfied that the enemy were advancing in force on Gettysburg, Buford, having reported accordingly, made arrangements to hold his ground as long as possible.

Meade's intention, in taking up his position, seems to have been to stand on the defensive, and await attack from Lee, on the line of Pipe Creek. On the 30th his various corps were somewhat scattered, but the general idea seems to have been that any corps encountering the enemy should fall back fighting on to the new line, and that Lee should thus have been drawn into attacking the Federal army in entrenchments. However, as

events will show, this plan never came into effect ; the brilliant action of Buford being instrumental in transferring the scene of action into another quarter.

Up to the 28th, Lee, who through the absence of his cavalry was kept uninformed of events which were proceeding to the South, was in ignorance of the fact that Meade had moved to Frederick ; being under the impression that the Federal army was still south of the Potomac.

Preparations were made on this day to continue the advance on Harrisonburg ; but in the evening Lee heard for the first time that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was advancing towards South Mountain ; consequently all the preparations for the advance were at once arrested.

A glance at the map will show that the South Mountain range, running north from Harper's Ferry, and the Catoctin range, running north from Point of Rocks on the Potomac, and enclosing between them the Catoctin Valley, unite where the Gettysburg and Hagerstown road crosses them, between Fairfield and Waynesboro. This road was the line of Lee's retreat to the Shenandoah Valley.

In the absence of his cavalry, it was impossible for Lee to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, the intentions of the enemy, so he was compelled to act on probabilities.

What seems to have occurred to Lee, as the most

probable intention of the enemy, was their advance westward to intercept his communications with Virginia. As we know, this had been Hooker's original plan of campaign, but his supersession by Meade had made a complete change in the programme of the army of the Potomac.

However, Lee, acting under this impression, and not knowing definitely by which side of the mountains the enemy intended to advance, assumed that he would move westward; so determined accordingly to concentrate his army east of the mountains. By this means he no doubt considered that the concentration of his army in the neighbourhood of Gettysburg would place it nearer to Baltimore than the enemy, and unless the move was very quickly responded to he could move down between Baltimore and Washington, invest the capital, reopen communications with Virginia east of the mountains, and compel Meade to attack him, in his own selected position, or else compel the surrender of Washington. This was the bold course, and the course Lee selected, in preference to falling back on his communications to the westward of the mountains, and sacrificing the advantages he had already gained. Unfortunately, he had no information upon which he could rely, owing to the absence of his cavalry; and Meade's advance up the east side of mountains, unknown to Lee, frustrated the whole plan; though not till the question had been

desperately fought out, by an engagement which lasted for three days.

Orders were issued by Lee on the evening of the 28th June for a concentration at Gettysburg ; Longstreet and Hill moving forward from Chambersburg and Fayetteville respectively ; while Ewell was recalled from York and Carlisle.

A. P. Hill, on the 29th, pushed Heth's division forward to Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg ; on arrival at Cashtown Heth pushed forward one brigade, Pettigrew's, to Gettysburg ; this brigade found the town occupied by Buford's division of cavalry, as has already been related : Pettigrew declined an engagement and retired, reporting the fact to Hill. This information was reported by Hill to Lee, who hastened Ewell's march, and by the evening of the 30th the Confederate army stood in the following order : —

Longstreet, with two divisions, was at Fayetteville, about sixteen miles from Gettysburg ; his other division, Pickett's, was still at Chambersburg. A. P. Hill's Corps was at Cashtown and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road.

Ewell's Corps was at Heidlersburg, some ten miles north-east of Gettysburg, with Johnson's division at Greenwood.

The Confederate army was thus far more concentrated

on this date than Meade's force, which was still somewhat scattered; though Lee, from the imperfect nature of his information, was still ignorant of both the position and intention of his antagonist, and had apparently but little idea that Meade's army was east of the mountains, being seemingly of opinion that the troops reported in his front at Gettysburg were in all probability only the State Militia.

## CHAPTER IX

### GETTYSBURG



*1st July*

GETTYSBURG is a town of some importance, lying at the junction of ten important roads, connecting it on the east with York, Hanover and Baltimore ; on the south with Taneytown and Emmetsburg ; on the west with Fairfield and Chambersburg *via* Cashtown ; and on the north with Carlisle and Mummasburg.

The town itself is situated on low ground between two branches of the Monocacy River, which run from north to south ; that to the eastward being known as Rock Creek, and that to the westward as Willoughby's Run. The two streams are some two miles apart, the town being situated about half way between them.

A long ridge of high ground runs between the town and Willoughby's Run ; with a second ridge immediately above the river, to the west of the main ridge, stretching from the Cashtown road to the Fairfield road ; while on the opposite side of the stream the ground is high but not commanding.

About half-a-mile south of the town there is a high



GETTYSBURG




commanding ridge, running south between the Emmetsburg and Taneytown roads. At the north end of the ridge is an important height, known as Cemetery Hill, commanding the town from a distance of about half-a-mile ; while from two and a half to three miles south of the town the ridge terminates in two detached eminences known as Little Round Top and Round Top.

Rising directly above Rock Creek, and barely half-a-mile east of Cemetery Hill, is Culps Hill, and about a mile south of this another height, called Power's Hill, commanding the Baltimore road.

To the north of the town the country is flatter, and there are no hills of any importance excepting the ridge running north and south, before mentioned, between the western branch of the Monocacy and the Carlisle road, and which is traversed by the Mummasburg road. On the morning of the 1st July General Buford with his division of Federal cavalry was holding the ridges immediately to the west of Gettysburg ; with his outposts far out on the Cashtown and Fairfield roads ; he had dismounted a large portion of his force and was prepared, if possible, to hold his position against the enemy until the I. Corps should arrive to his support.

General Reynolds, commanding the wing of the Federal army, consisting of the I., III. and XI. Corps, made immediate dispositions to go forward to the support of Buford.




The I. Corps, at Marsh Creek, was ordered to advance at once upon Gettysburg ; the II. Corps, which was at Taneytown, stood fast ; while the III. Corps, at the same place, was ordered to relieve the XI. Corps at Emmetsburg ; the latter corps being under orders to join the I. Corps at Gettysburg as rapidly as possib'e.

The Confederate advance was begun early in the morning, A. P. Hill sending forward Heth's division to occupy Gettysburg. Soon after 9 A.M. Heth encountered Buford's cavalry about three miles west of the town. Buford gave way but slowly, taking advantage of every circumstance that could tend to delay the enemy ; but was at length driven back to the wooded hill on the immediate west of Gettysburg. Here he received the support of the I. Corps, one division of which, under Wadsworth, had arrived.

The Confederates advanced against the position with considerable vigour ; the brigade on the left under Davis drove back the troops opposed to it in some confusion ; but Archer's brigade on the right had its right flank turned, and lost heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners ; among the latter was General Archer himself.

About this time General Reynolds was killed, and the command devolved upon General Howard of the XI. Corps, who had ridden on in advance of his troops. Seeing the seriousness of the situation, he at once sent word to the XI. Corps to make all possible haste to reach the field.

# Gettysburg 19 July about 11 AM



At the same time he sent a request to Slocum, who commanded the XII. Corps, then at Two Taverns, to come to his assistance. Slocum, however, declined to move without orders from Meade. Considering he was only five miles from the field of battle, and must have been fully conscious that a serious conflict was proceeding, his conduct is somewhat difficult of comprehension and, to say the least, reprehensible.

Hill now deployed the whole of Heth's division, with Pender's division as a support in the second line, and recommenced the advance soon after 1 o'clock, and was soon hotly engaged with the Federal I. Corps, now occupying the line of the Seminary Ridge.

At 12.45 Howard's XI. Corps began to arrive; two divisions were at once ordered to prolong the line of the I. Corps to the right, while the remaining division, together with the reserve artillery, was ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, as a general reserve to the whole line.

About 1.30 Ewell's two Confederate divisions began to come into action; they had come, one from Carlisle and the other from York, and had timed their march with considerable exactitude, both reaching Gettysburg simultaneously.

Thus assailed by Ewell from the north and by Hill from the west, the position of the Federal force became somewhat desperate. The two divisions of the XI. Corps,

Barlow's and Schimmelpfennig's, were hastily formed to face Ewell's attack, the right resting on a wooded knoll on the bank of Rock Creek ; their left was more than a quarter of a mile from the right of the I. Corps, thus leaving a somewhat dangerous interval.

Early's division of Ewell's Corps made a desperate attack on the right division of the XI. Corps, under Barlow, which they succeeded in enveloping. Barlow himself was shot, and the whole of the XI. Corps was driven back in some confusion to Gettysburg. Custer's brigade of cavalry, which was sent by Howard to cover the retirement of the two divisions of the XI. Corps, was also overwhelmed, and forced back with the rest. This retirement of the XI. Corps left the right of the I. Corps under General Doubleday, which was still holding on to the Seminary Ridge, completely exposed. Doubleday at once sent a brigade to cover his flank, which came into action outside of the Mummasburg road ; this brigade, though very roughly handled, held on for some time, and a second brigade was subsequently sent to their support.

Hill now threw in all his forces against the I. Corps, and the only question left for the Federal commander was how it could be extricated before it was annihilated.

Howard at this time had a reserve on Cemetery Hill, but he seems to have made no use whatever of it ; and, beyond sending Buford's cavalry to demonstrate on the

right flank of the attack, he seems to have left the I. Corps to work out its own salvation.

After suffering terrible losses, General Doubleday succeeded in making good his retirement to Cemetery Hill.

About 4.30 General Hancock had arrived with orders from Meade to take over the command from General Howard. It is probable that Meade had some recollection of Howard's performances at Chancellorsville. Howard, being senior to Hancock, refused to submit to this supersession, and a somewhat unseemly altercation took place between them, which resulted in Hancock's resolving to return to Meade's headquarters; however, at Howard's request, he remained to assist him in re-organising the shattered remains of the two corps.

General Lee arrived upon the scene of action in time to witness the retreat of the I. and XI. Corps; but he does not seem to have realised at once the full extent of the victory his troops had gained. The broken divisions now reforming on Cemetery Hill were in no condition to withstand another attack, and a resolute advance in force would doubtless have placed Lee in possession of that position in a very short time, and probably have reduced the I. and XI. Corps to a condition which would have rendered them unfit to fight again.

Lee probably guessed that he had in reality only crushed the advanced guard of the enemy, and knew he had lost very heavily in so doing; and that the other five corps of

the enemy were converging on Gettysburg ; though from the imperfect nature of his information he was ignorant of their exact position. This no doubt induced in him a larger degree of caution than was inherent in his nature ; true, he sent a recommendation to Ewell that he should follow the enemy up ; Ewell, however, in the exercise of his discretion did not do so ; his divisions had been severely handled, he had lost some 3000 men, and possibly felt that for the moment he could not call upon his men for further exertions. Moreover, he was short of two brigades, having sent Smith's and Gordon's brigades to meet a reported advance of the enemy on the York road ; he also probably thought it would be advisable to await the arrival of Johnson's fresh division before renewing the contest.


Lee also probably thought it advisable to bring up Longstreet, before risking further offensive movements.

However, whatever the reasons may have been, the opportunity was lost ; an opportunity which never recurred and which had a powerful effect on the ultimate fortunes of the campaign.

Before night the Federal forces were considerably reinforced. The III. (Sickles) Corps arrived from Emmetsburg, and the XII. (Slocum) Corps from Two Taverns, and the whole force concentrated on the Cemetery Ridge, with Wadsworth's brigade of the I. Corps holding Culps Hill.



# GETTYSBURG, Evening of 18 July



During the night the remainder of Lee's army reached the scene of action, Longstreet's Corps arriving, with the exception of Pickett's division, which remained at Chambersburg as a rear-guard.

*2nd July*

On the morning of the 2nd July, Lee's army occupied the ground it had won the previous day. Longstreet on the right occupied the southern part of the Seminary Ridge; Hill's Corps, in the centre, was on that portion of the Seminary Ridge which lies immediately to the west of Gettysburg; while Ewell, on the left, held the town, and the ground in the immediate vicinity facing south.

Lee's force thus formed a large part of a semicircle on the front and the right flank of the Federal army. This was somewhat of a disadvantage to Lee, as the Federal army, acting on interior lines, was enabled to communicate between its different parts far more rapidly, and the concentration of troops on any threatened point could be carried out with far more expedition by them, than was possible to the Confederate army, spread out on the circumference of the circle.

Meade arrived on the field in the early hours of the morning, and for some time seems to have been overwhelmed with uncertainty as to the proper course to pursue.

The first idea which struck him seems to have been the

necessity of snatching the initiative from his opponent ; and with this intention he proposed to concentrate his troops on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, and fall upon Ewell's Corps, which extended on a broad front along the north of his position, and which, being somewhat isolated, seemed to offer a not too difficult objective. With this intention before him, Meade moved Geary's division of the XII. Corps from Little Round Top, to the southern slopes of Culp's Hill, and then moved off with Warren and Slocum to reconnoitre the ground.

Meade's two subordinates were altogether opposed to assuming the offensive rôle and dissuaded their chief from his purpose, firstly on account of the unsuitability of the ground on which the attack would have had to be made, and secondly they urged the wisdom of awaiting the arrival of the whole of his forces before risking any advance.

Meade fell in with their view, and decided to stand on the defensive, for which purpose his force was eventually disposed in the following order :—

The XII. Corps was on the extreme right ; one division, Wadsworth's, of the I. Corps occupied Culp's Hill, and the XI. Corps Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the I. Corps in support ; the II. Corps were on the left of the XI. Corps, with the V. Corps on the extreme left, and the VI. Corps in rear of Round Top as a general reserve. The III. (Sickles) Corps was also on the left, but was

thrown somewhat forward on to the Emmetsburg road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard; the portion of his corps on the left was thrown back to cover the front of Little Round Top, thus making a right angle with the other portion of the corps at the Peach Orchard; a formation which was productive of somewhat disastrous results.


It was about 2 P.M. before the whole of the Union army arrived on the battlefield; and yet, for some strange and unexplained reason, Lee delayed his attack till late in the afternoon. Lee might easily have manœuvred Meade out of his position and at any rate should have made his attack in the early morning, as at that time the V. and VI. Corps of the Union army, as well as two brigades of the III. Corps, were still far away.

Lee's intention was to assail both flanks of the Union army simultaneously, and crush it between the converging columns; and had he done so early in the day there is little doubt but that he would have been successful.

A great deal has been written and said as to Lee's reasons for this delay; and the truth seems to lie in the fact that Longstreet was disinclined to attack until Pickett's division had come up.

Considerable delay was also caused by the bad leading of McLaws' and Hood's divisions; Colonel Johnstone of the Staff, who led them, to avoid being seen by the Federal signallers on Little Round Top, made a long detour down the Fairfield road; so that it was 3 o'clock

# GETTYSBURG - 2nd July About 3.p.m.



before Hood's division reached the Emmetsburg road and began to deploy, and considerably later before McLaws was able to come into action. The attack, however, was eventually commenced soon after 3 P.M., and before the arrival of Pickett's division, which, however, arrived soon after the attack commenced but was never brought into action.

When the attack commenced, Longstreet launched three of his divisions, Hood's on the right, McLaws' in the centre and Anderson's, of Hill's Corps, on the left, against the left of the Federal line, under cover of a terrific artillery fire. The attack fell mainly on Sickles' Corps, and soon raged hotly round the angle of the Peach Orchard.

Sickles was soon reinforced from the V. Corps, by part of the II. Corps, two regiments of the XII. Corps and a brigade of the I. Corps.

Apparently Lee was under the impression that Meade's main line was on the Emmetsburg road, and that his flank rested on the Peach Orchard; whereas, as a matter of fact, Sickles occupied an advanced line, and the V. (Sykes) Corps the main line in rear. With this idea Lee had ordered Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road and push the enemy back towards Cemetery Hill; but these orders could not be carried out as it exposed his flank to an attack from the V. Corps on Little Round Top.

The Peach Orchard was carried, and the Federal troops driven back in confusion, with the loss of several guns, and Sickles himself was badly wounded. The victorious Confederates pressed on and one brigade of Anderson's division gained the crest, upon which Sickles' Corps were being reformed, and held on for some time, but as night approached, exhausted with continuous fighting with a numerically superior enemy, they were compelled to fall back.

Hood, meanwhile, on the Confederate extreme right, made a desperate attack on Round Top Hill. He nearly succeeded, and had his attack begun but a few minutes earlier he would have carried the hill. When Sickles had carried his line forward to the Peach Orchard, he had left the summit of Little Round Top undefended. When the fighting began, Meade sent Warren to examine the ground about Little Round Top, and it was Warren himself who detected Hood's advance against the hill. He at once sent for the nearest troops, which happened to be Weed's brigade of the V. Corps, who advanced to the hill at a run just in time to check Hood's advance. Had Longstreet realised that the Federal left flank was not as he supposed at the Peach Orchard, and duly supported Hood's attack, the Round Top Hill would have been carried, and the Federal flank would have been seriously compromised.

As it was, the flank was securely held, thanks to

Warren's prompt action ; and, though the Federal line was pierced in the centre by the defeat of Sickles' Corps, the Confederate divisions were brought to a standstill on the ground they had gained.

This piercing of his line caused considerable alarm to Meade, and it is recorded that at one time he was seriously considering the advisability of a retreat on Westminster. Confidence, however, was somewhat restored by the failure of Longstreet's attack on Little Round Top, which was saved by the advance of Sedgwick's Corps.

Longstreet's attack had been in a great measure successful ; he had nearly succeeded in crushing the left of Meade's army ; and the bold pushing to the front of the Federal reserve artillery alone held the assault in check when the infantry had been hopelessly broken.

It was Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union army should be assailed simultaneously, while the intermediate forces made a strong demonstration against his centre. Ewell's whole corps should have assaulted while Longstreet was holding Meade's left, and compelling him to withdraw troops from the other flank to resist his onslaught ; but Ewell did not move to the attack until Longstreet's assault had practically spent its force, and could accomplish no more.

There is always a danger in an attack by converging columns, that the attacks should not be properly timed,



and that one should have spent its force before the other is launched ; and to this reason may be attributed the fact that Lee failed to gain the advantage that was within his grasp on the 2nd July.

Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps, which had been posted on the extreme left, moved out by Rock Creek to assail the right of the Federal line at Culps Hill held by Wadsworth's division, and also the point still farther to the right held by Geary's division of the XII. Corps.

Earlier in the day Meade had moved Geary's division from its position to the support of Sykes' Corps against Longstreet's attack ; consequently Johnson, finding this part of the line defenceless, took possession of Geary's abandoned works about 6 P.M., and thus endangered Meade's communications. Ewell sent a brigade to reinforce Johnson, and directed Early's division to storm Cemetery Hill ; the attack was partially successful ; one brigade gained the summit, but being unsupported in time was driven back with heavy loss. This failure to carry Cemetery Hill left Johnson's division isolated on the extreme right of the Federal position ; and as it could only be reached by a long circuit it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there without unduly weakening other parts of his line.


During the afternoon the Federal cavalry under Kilpatrick moved out with the intention of circling round and attacking the left and rear of Lee's army by

way of Hunterstown ; in this they were foiled, however, by the arrival, about 4 P.M., of Stuart's cavalry after its long march. After a somewhat fierce engagement, Kilpatrick retired and bivouacked at Two Taverns for the night.

Meade appears to have been uneasy at the result of the day's conflict and the state of affairs, which was undoubtedly somewhat disheartening. In the combat of the preceding day the I. and XI. Corps had been almost annihilated ; and the result of the fighting on the 2nd was that the III., the V. and part of the II. Corps were much scattered, and only the VI. and XII. Corps remained comparatively fresh. True the attack on his left had been repulsed, but his centre was pierced, and on his right the enemy had gained a position, in the air it is true, but nevertheless threatening his communications and absolutely prolonging his own line. Under the circumstances Meade called a council of war, at which it is said he strongly advocated an instant retirement ; however, his corps commanders were not with him in this, and unanimously voted in favour of remaining to fight it out.

The result ultimately proved that this decision was right, at least the result was success ; not so much it is true from any great display of merit in the Union commander, as through mistakes committed on the Confederate side ; and one can hardly blame Meade for his

GETTYSBURG. 2<sup>ND</sup> JULY - ABOUT 5 P.M.



want of confidence after the result of the two days' fighting. If the enemy gained any great success on the ensuing day, the position of his army would become serious, to say the least, and might possibly be destroyed as an organisation. By retiring, while it was yet in his power, his mission of covering the great cities of the North would be fulfilled, as the enemy's exhausted condition would have prevented a very active pursuit; moreover, being far from their base of supplies, and their ammunition being low, they could not for a time have acted very energetically.

However, as we have said before, Meade's resolution was overruled, and the two armies bivouacked on the field, to fight the matter to a finish on the morrow.

### *3rd July*

During the night Meade reinforced his right, and determined at daylight to endeavour to drive off Johnson's division, which not only endangered his safety, but compromised his line of retreat. Ewell, appreciating the importance of the foothold which Johnson had obtained, sent two brigades of Rodes' division to reinforce him. The Federals opened a heavy artillery fire on Johnson at daylight, to which he was unable to reply, as from the steepness of the declivity, and the nature of the ground, he had been unable to bring up any artillery with him.

In the hopes of winning a better position Johnson attacked, and a severe struggle ensued, lasting for three or four hours ; Meade, however, sent a division of the XII. Corps to reinforce the Federal forces, which forming on the left of Johnson took him in flank ; and, further reinforcements arriving, Johnson was compelled to give up the contest about 11 A.M., and withdrew slowly and reluctantly to Rock Creek, where he remained during the rest of the action.

It now became apparent to Lee that it was impossible to turn either of the Federal flanks, with any hope of disorganising their army or striking it in reverse, yet to abandon the offensive rôle would be to acknowledge defeat. He reconnoitred the position carefully, and saw that the enemy's wings were practically impregnable, but that, Longstreet having gained possession of the crest which skirted the Emmetsburg road, it was possible for him to envelop the centre of the Federal army with artillery fire, and thus render their hold on this portion of the position untenable against a vigorous infantry assault. He resolved therefore to mass his artillery against this portion of the position, and then assault with Pickett's division, which had not yet been engaged and was still bivouacked about four miles away on the Chambersburg road, supported on either flank by the advance of the other portions of his army.

Early in the morning Meade rearranged his forces

to meet the impending attack: the XII. Corps had already been moved to the right of the line to dislodge Johnson. The III. Corps, completely shattered by Longstreet's attack on the previous day, was withdrawn from the first line and posted in reserve in rear of the V. Corps, which held the two Round Top hills and the southern extremity of the Cemetery Ridge, where they connected with Stannard's brigade of the I. Corps. The VI. Corps was held in reserve, but detached two brigades to cover the Baltimore road. The XI. Corps stood in its old position on the Cemetery Hill, facing north.

Pickett's division reached the Seminary Ridge between 8 and 9 A.M., and after resting was moved about 10 A.M. to the rear of the wooded ridge west of the Peach Orchard. In front of them the artillery of Longstreet's and Hill's Corps were massed in a position stretching from the Peach Orchard to the Seminary, and six brigades of Hill's Corps were brought into position on the western slope of Seminary Hill, ready to move forward with Pickett's division when the time arrived. Four brigades of Anderson's division were placed in reserve; and the command of the whole attack placed in Longstreet's hands.

At 1 P.M. a terrific fire was opened from the massed Confederate batteries against the position occupied by the I. Corps, the II. Corps, the III. Corps and the XI. Corps.

This terrific fire of 150 guns, to which the Federals were only able to reply with 80, owing to lack of space from the conformation of the position they occupied, dealt terrible havoc ; and at the end of the two hours during which it lasted the Federal artillery ceased firing. The extreme right of the Federal army was taken in reverse by the fire, and a portion of the right centre was enfiladed, while Meade's headquarters were so riddled with shot that they had to be hastily removed. The reserve artillery, also, had to be moved to the rear out of range.

The fire was so hot that during its continuance it was quite impossible for fresh guns or infantry to be brought into action.

General Hunt, commanding the artillery of the army of the Potomac, writes : " The destruction of material was large. The enemy's cannonade, in which he must have exhausted his ammunition, was well sustained, and cost us many horses, and the explosion of a large number of caissons and limbers. The whole slope behind the crest, although concealed from the enemy, was swept by his shot, and afforded no protection to carriages and horses."

The fire of the Federal artillery ceased about 2.30 P.M., and about half-an-hour later, through lack of ammunition, the fire of Lee's artillery gradually died away ; but it had accomplished its purpose, and had the infantry attack


been launched when the fire of Meade's guns ceased, the position would in all probability have been carried, and victory have rested with the army of Virginia.

But for some inexplicable reason the attack was delayed for nearly an hour, and it was 3.30 P.M. before Pickett's advance commenced. This gave the Federal army the respite it required ; the worn-out and damaged batteries were withdrawn, and fresh ones that had not been engaged sent from the reserve to supply their places ; ammunition was replenished, and the damage done by the fire of the Confederate artillery repaired ; so that Pickett's division was called upon to attack the position occupied by fresh artillery, and unsupported by their own batteries, which were silent through want of ammunition.

The assaulting column, numbering about 14,000 men, had to traverse a distance of about a mile and a half from the woods, behind which they had been formed up, to the ridge which was their objective. Their formation was a sort of echelon, of which Pickett's division formed the centre ; a few hundred yards on the left rear they were followed by Pettigrew's division with his four brigades in line ; followed by the brigades of Scales and Lane under command of Trimble. Armistead's brigade followed on Pickett's right, followed in their turn by Wilcox's brigade on their right rear. Throughout the whole advance they were severely shelled, and



077800Z - Rockets attack about 5:30 pm 30 July



suffered considerably. About 500 yards from the enemy's position Pickett changed his direction half left, a movement which was not conformed to by Wilcox on his right, who kept straight on ; consequently there was soon a wide interval between them, and Pickett's right was thus uncovered.

The main attack of the Confederate infantry fell first upon that portion of the position occupied by Gibbon's division : Hay's brigade was the first to suffer from the Confederate rush, and in spite of a desperate attack on their right flank, by Stannard's brigade of the I. Corps, Pickett's division swept on, overwhelming Hay's brigade, driving it back through the batteries on the crest. Though mown down in masses by the artillery fire nothing could check the Confederate charge for the moment, the ridge was gained and some of the Federal batteries fell into the hands of Pickett's troops.

Meanwhile, however, Pettigrew's division on Pickett's left had been assailed in flank, and so severely handled that it was unable to advance to the support of Pickett ; and Wilcox, who had deployed his division, was also assailed in flank by Stannard's brigade and, being unable to obtain any foothold and finding himself exposed to a terrific cross-fire, was obliged to retreat, leaving a large portion of his command prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

Longstreet meanwhile despatched three brigades

against the two Round Top Hills, to prevent reinforcements being sent to that part of the line assailed by Pickett; they were met by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, which had arrived on the field about 2 P.M. and taken up its position on the left of the Federal army. A fierce combat ensued, and although Kilpatrick was eventually compelled to fall back, there is little doubt that his action prevented any assault upon Round Top, or any reinforcements being sent from this portion of the Confederate forces to the assistance of Pickett.

Having gained the ridge Pickett quickly saw that it would be absolutely impossible for him to hold the position. The II. Corps was assailing him in front, the I. Corps was closing in on his right flank, and the III. Corps was rapidly moving up to the attack; the supports on both his left and right were dispersed and nothing but annihilation awaited him if he remained where he was. The order to retire was given; the retreat soon became a rout, and the magnificent division, which had advanced and gained the ridge in the face of such an overwhelming fire, streamed back with but little organisation remaining, a helpless mass of fugitives.

Of Pickett's three brigade commanders Garnet and Armistead were killed, and Kemper dangerously wounded, while of the regimental commanders only two came unscathed out of the fray. Of Pettigrew's division but the merest fragment remained.

Stuart, who had halted on the York road on the night of the 2nd, moved off on the morning of the 3rd with the intention of passing round the right flank of the Federal army, and attacking them in rear. About 10 o'clock, however, he came in touch with Gregg's division of the Federal cavalry, about four miles east of Gettysburg, which Pleasanton had posted on that flank to guard against the very scheme which Stuart was trying to carry out. Stuart endeavoured to give them the slip, but they were in too great strength for him to get past them, and a sanguinary contest ensued, in which the Federal horse were slowly forced back; but Stuart's object was frustrated, and the Confederate cavalry were compelled to remain in position all day waiting for opportunities which never arose.

That the last great stroke having failed, the day was lost was at once apparent to Lee, who worked with untiring energy to repair the disaster. Not imagining for a moment that Meade would neglect to take advantage of the opportunity he had gained, he hastened his preparations to resist the counter-attack he regarded as inevitable. The danger was acute, a successful counter-stroke would inevitably turn defeat into a hopeless disaster.

Lee at once planted batteries in the interval between Longstreet and Hill, behind which the fugitives might rally, and hastened to the spot to personally reassure

his dispirited troops, and superintend their reorganisation. But Meade made no move, and was content to remain on the ridge he had successfully held; and the golden opportunity of ending the war by a swift and overwhelming blow, which the Confederates were for the moment in no case to resist, was gone for ever.

## CHAPTER X

### LEE'S RETREAT

THROUGHOUT the 4th July the two armies remained in their positions watching each other. Meade made no move, and Lee plainly saw that his only course was to retreat; and moreover that it was necessary to carry out his movement before Meade should awake to a full realisation of the opportunity which lay within his grasp.

To retreat in the face of a victorious enemy, burdened with four or five thousand prisoners and some fifteen miles of trains, over roads which were bad and much cut up, was no easy task even if the retreat were unmolested; had Meade pursued energetically it might have been found an impossible one.

A new peril, moreover, had arisen for the Confederate army. On the 1st July the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, left behind in Virginia by Lee, crossed the Potomac by the pontoon bridge at Falling Water, leaving behind only a small post to guard the bridge. News of this reached General French, commanding the Federal force at Frederick. He at once despatched a regiment of cavalry, who cut up the post and burned the bridge.

At the same time heavy rains set in which rendered all the fords impassable.

There were two roads open to Lee by which he could cross the passes of South Mountain and reach Williamsport where he determined to cross the Potomac ; both these roads were covered by his position on the Seminary Ridge. The northern road, *via* Chambersburg, made the distance to Williamsport about fifty-eight miles ; while by the southern and more direct route, crossing the mountains at Monterey Springs, the distance was about forty-two miles. Lee started his trains by the latter road on the morning of the 4th July, the passes being held by the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, who took charge of the convoy as soon as it reached the mountains.

On the night of the 3rd, Hill's Corps evacuated Gettysburg and fell back on Oak Hill ; and on the evening of the 4th commenced their retreat along the Fairfield road ; Ewell's Corps closing in from the left and taking their place.

During the same night Longstreet's Corps followed Hill, leaving at daylight only Ewell's Corps to confront the Federal army. By noon the last remaining corps gradually drew off, Early's division bringing up the rear, and the field of Gettysburg was abandoned by the Confederate army.

On the evening of the 4th, Kilpatrick, who was with his brigade at Emmetsburg, hearing of the retirement of


Lee's trains on Monterey, made a dash to attack them. Late at night he came up with the rear of the waggons near that place ; the waggons, which could with difficulty be got up the pass, owing to the condition of the road, were heaped up in some confusion, and Kilpatrick succeeded in firing a few, and taking a few prisoners ; but the village was held in force by Jones' dismounted troopers, and he did not succeed in penetrating or doing any material damage before he was compelled to retire.

On the early morning of the 5th, Stuart, to cover the retreating columns, made a dash with three brigades on Emmetsburg ; here he heard of Kilpatrick's march and went in pursuit ; Kilpatrick, however, drew off south, and Stuart retired to regain touch with his own army.

On the night of the 5th, the advanced guard of Lee's army passed through Monterey ; the rear-guard occupying Fairfield. Meade, on the same date, as it appeared certain that the Confederates were retiring, ordered Sedgwick to follow them up. He came up with Early near Fairfield ; Early at the time was much encumbered with the trains which were in some confusion, and an energetic attack by Sedgwick, well supported, would probably have resulted in the capture at least of the greater part of Lee's waggons. But Sedgwick seems to have been as strongly imbued with the principles of caution as Meade himself ; and after a short artillery action he reported the position as too strong to be carried, and did nothing.



Early on the 6th July, Longstreet's Corps passed across South Mountain and turned southward, moving as rapidly as possible upon Williamsport, to forestall any Federal movement in that direction. Hill's Corps remained on



the western slopes to support Ewell, who still held on to the eastern outlet of the defile.

On the same day the Federal cavalry reached the banks of the Antietam; and nearly succeeded in capturing a convoy escorted by Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade, which was held up on the Williamsport and Chambers-

burg road, near the former place, owing to the unfordable state of the river. The convoy was saved by the timely arrival of Stuart, who, after his encounter with Kilpatrick, had taken the road to Leitersburg, and moved down on Williamsport *via* Hagerstown. The same evening Longstreet's advanced guard reached Williamsport, where they bivouacked.

On the 7th Lee established his headquarters at Hagerstown, where the bulk of his forces had closed up. Meade, at the same time, was at Frederick, but the bulk of his army had not advanced farther south than Emmetsburg.

Lee had now a critical position to face ; the swollen condition of the river presented for the present an insuperable barrier to further retreat, and the victorious Federal army, already considerably reinforced, was scarcely a day's march behind him ; but he rose nobly to the occasion, and in the midst of gathering troubles his coolness and power of judgment shone out at their best. He selected a position extending from the Potomac, near Mercersville, to the Williamsport-Hagerstown road, with his left thrown back encircling Williamsport, which he entrenched ; Stuart at the same time being ordered to proceed on the 8th, and drive back the advancing Federals to the foot of the hills. Covered by the position he commenced another bridge over the Potomac.

Stuart moved out on the 8th with four brigades of cavalry, and attacked the Federal outposts on Beaver

Creek ; and compelled the whole hostile line to retire. The Federals fell back slowly to the hills, where they were reinforced with guns and infantry, which compelled Stuart in his turn to fall back to Beaver Creek. The fight ended where it had begun, but the Federal cavalry had been held at bay for a whole day and Lee's object was attained.

On the following day Lee marched his forces to their assigned positions. Longstreet's Corps occupied the right, and Hill the centre, while Ewell still held on to Hagerstown with instructions to fall back on Williamsport if attacked. Stuart drew off towards the north to check any turning movement which Meade might have in view against Hagerstown.

On the 10th July Meade advanced and began the passage of South Mountain, with a view to attacking Lee's position. His customary caution, however, did not desert him ; with the result that his advance was slow, and he appears to have been personally disinclined to hazard any attack on Lee's position.

On the 11th July Ewell evacuated Hagerstown, and fell back to his new position covering Williamsport. The new bridge at Falling Water was completed on this date and during the night the Confederate trains commenced their passage of the Potomac.

Meade, who had taken two days to advance twelve miles, at length crossed the Antietam on the 12th, and formed up across the Sharpsburg-Hagerstown road, his

cavalry occupying Hagerstown ; and the outposts of the two armies were once again in touch.

That evening Meade received a peremptory message from Halleck, that he was to drive the Confederate forces from Maryland ; he accordingly resolved upon the attack for the 14th July.

Lee, meantime, had resolved, now that his bridge was completed, to go. Heavy rain had begun again, with the possibility of again rendering the fords impassable, and thus reducing him to the possible necessity of the dangerous predicament of being compelled to pass his whole army over a single pontoon bridge ; every preparation was therefore made to cross the river and disappear during the night of the 13th. Ewell's Corps was ordered to cross by the ford at Williamsport ; all the guns were to cross by the bridge, and Longstreet's Corps to follow the guns, while A. P. Hill brought up the rear, crossing by the bridge. The cavalry were ordered to follow Ewell through the ford.

The passage was slow, and it was 6 o'clock before Ewell's Corps was collected on the southern bank. At 9 o'clock, just as Hill's rear-guard was preparing to cross the bridge, they were attacked by the Federal cavalry, and several regiments were compelled hastily to man a line of entrenchment thrown up on the northern bank to cover the bridge. The Federal cavalry was quickly checked, and the passage of the bridge resumed.

On the 14th Meade gave the orders to set the whole Federal force in motion for the attack on Lee's position ; but it was too late. Lee's position was found evacuated, and before noon the last Confederate soldier was south of the Potomac.

On the 17th and 18th July Meade crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and moving down the eastern slopes of the Blue Mountains endeavoured by a rapid movement to the southward to cut off Lee's retreat upon Richmond, and force him to another battle.

Lee, divining his object, by a clever disposition of his rear-guard, held up Meade's army near Manassas Gap for a whole day, and passing the mountains farther south successfully evaded Meade, and concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Culpepper and Orange Court House. Meade, finding Lee thus across his route to Richmond, moved to Warrenton, where he concentrated his forces.

The Federal army was about this period considerably reduced in strength by the discharge of a large number of time-expired volunteers, and by the necessity to detach troops to New York, where considerable rioting was taking place ; this compelled Meade to remain on the defensive.

Towards the end of September Longstreet's Corps, less Pickett's division, was sent westward by rail to reinforce Bragg in Tennessee ; Pickett's division, or rather what

was left of it, was sent south to cover the railway junction at Petersburg.

On the 20th September the battle of Chickamauga was fought in Tennessee, in which the Federal army under Rosecrans was nearly destroyed by the combined forces of Bragg and Longstreet. Meade, in consequence, was ordered to send the XI. and XII. Corps at once to Washington, whence they were conveyed to the West.


Lee, who had been reinforced with drafts of recruits and horses, took advantage of this opportunity to move out again against Meade. He determined to move round Meade's right, in much the same way as he had moved against Pope in the previous year, and fall on his communications with Washington; thus compelling him to fight an offensive battle to reopen them.

A. P. Hill's Corps was moved out to the south-westward, and making a detour reached Madison on the 9th October, Lee concentrating all his forces at that place on the following day.

Meade, who had advanced to the fords of the Rapidan, now assuming that Lee intended to operate against his right flank, moved in the direction of Culpepper.

Lee occupied Culpepper on the 11th; and Meade continued his advance on that place on the following day, with two corps, leaving his other three corps on the line of the Rappahannock. When Meade's cavalry reached Culpepper they found that Lee had gone;

Meade consequently halted his two corps in the neighbourhood of Brandy Station.



Meanwhile Lee had advanced ; Hill's Corps on the 12th reaching Amisville ; and Ewell's Jefferson.

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News of this was brought to Meade late in the evening of the 12th; and in consequence he ordered a rapid retirement on Bull Run for the following day; his advanced guards reaching Three Mile Station and Warrenton Junction on the evening of the 13th.

On the 14th Lee directed Hill to move as far as Buckland Mills, and then make for Bristow Station and strike the retreating enemy in flank. Ewell at the same time was ordered to move through Auburn on Greenwich to join hands with Hill.

When Hill reached the railway at Bristow Station he encountered the II. (Warren) Corps, which he at once vigorously attacked, but met with a severe repulse, losing five guns and some hundreds of prisoners.

Warren, after repulsing Hill, fell back and joined Meade, who was now strongly posted on the east bank of the Bull Run.

On the 15th Meade advanced, and Lee, who had destroyed the railway, fell back before him; and the short campaign ended in the opposing forces reoccupying much the same positions as they had quitted a month previously; with no result beyond imposing another considerable delay to any Federal advance, until the railway could be repaired.

Lee now made his headquarters at Culpepper; with Hill's Corps covering the Warrenton Road, and Ewell's Corps watching the railway on a line from Rappahannock



Station, down to Kelly's Ford, which was held by Rodes' division.

On the 6th November, Meade, who was on the line from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, again advanced. The V. and VI. Corps, under Sedgwick, were ordered to advance on Rappahannock Station, while the rest of his force was to concentrate at Bealton Station and force the passage of the river at Kelly's Ford.

The passage of the river was forced at both points, the Confederates driven back with considerable loss, and Culpepper was occupied by the Federal troops.

Lee was now compelled to take up a new line for the protection of the railway through Orange Court House to Gordonsville, behind the Rapidan, with his right resting in the neighbourhood of Verdiersville, and his headquarters near Clark's Mountain.

Meade now determined to cross the Rappahannock lower down, where Hooker had crossed in his advance upon Chancellorsville, march rapidly through the Wilderness, round Lee's right, and draw him farther south into the open country, where his superior numbers would give him the advantage.

Meade accordingly issued orders for an advance on the 25th in the following order:—the III. and VI. Corps were to move by Jacob's Ford; the I. and V. Corps by Ely's Ford and gain the Plank road at Parker's Store;

while the II. Corps moved on to the Pike road by way of Germanna Ford.

The swollen condition of the river, and the want of proper reconnoissance of the fords, caused considerable delay and confusion, and it was not until the 27th that the Federal army, considerably exhausted, stood upon the south side of the Rappahannock.

The march of the enemy's columns was reported to Lee, and before night on the 26th he was fully aware of their intention. He at once ordered Ewell to advance along the Pike road, and attack the enemy before he emerged from the Wilderness, while Hill was hurried up to his support.

In order to check the Federal advance and to enable Hill to come into line with Ewell, Lee, on the 27th, took up a position on the west bank of Mine Run, which flows northward from Verdiersville into the Rapidan.

Meade's advance was slow, and by the time he had come in front of the Confederate position, on the 28th, Hill had joined Ewell, and the line of Mine Run was strongly entrenched. Meade spent two days in careful reconnoissance of the Confederate position; which led him to the conclusion that it was beyond his power to break through it. Consequently he abandoned the attempt, and determined to retreat. Meade regained his cantonments on the 3rd December, and both armies went into winter quarters, thus bringing to a conclusion the campaign of 1863 in Eastern Virginia.

## CHAPTER XI

### MORE REFLECTIONS

THE campaign of 1863 in Eastern Virginia thus closed leaving the two armies relatively in the same positions as when it commenced. Two great actions had been fought, both in a more or less degree decisive. At Chancellorsville a great opportunity was presented to Hooker of crushing Lee, and thus bringing the end of the war within a measurable distance, by leaving the road to the southern capital open.

No general probably ever had a greater opportunity of achieving a decisive result; and few have failed more completely to take advantage of the favours offered by fortune. The chance of successfully ending the war was missed, and the decision achieved was the grant of a new lease of life to the South.

At Gettysburg the issue that hung in the balance was the fate of the Union States. Lee made a bold bid to end the war once and for all by crushing the Federal army in the heart of their own territory; and had he been successful there is but little doubt that the independence of the South would have been secured.

Gettysburg must probably rank as the decisive action of the whole war. The victory of the Federal army cleared their territory of invaders, and put an end to all further offensive action by the Southerners in the east. True, in the following year, a raid led by Ewell penetrated to within fifteen miles of Washington, but this cannot be considered in the light of a serious invasion as Lee's main army was held at the time by Grant in Virginia.

In the following year the war was carried by Grant into Virginia; Lee stood for more than a year on the defensive; and though, throughout the bloody campaign in the Wilderness and on the Anna, his defence was of the aggressive description, it was slowly worn out, till the South died practically of attrition.

Thus we may safely class Gettysburg as the most decisive battle of the war; the fate of the North hung upon its issue, and its result sealed the fate of the South; not immediately, it is true, but none the less surely.

Lee's great strategical scheme of making a flank move round a superior enemy, exposing his communications, and attempting to bring the war to a conclusion by a decisive defeat of the Federal forces in the heart of the Union States, may seem at first sight to savour of too much boldness. Yet it was the one course open to Lee in the face of the military as well as of the political situation, and events have shown how near it

went to complete success. It failed apparently from a few tactical errors on the battlefield ; the actual causes of failure, however, were probably of deeper origin and were caused by the administration neglecting to provide Lee adequately with the sinews of war, and thus delaying his march.

It seems strange, in looking back on the events as we can read them now, to understand the blindness of President Davis' Cabinet to the obvious necessities of the moment, and to the gloomy future which was so certainly closing in upon the Confederate States, if they could not by one supreme blow lay the North at their feet.

Every day the blockade of their posts was tightening, with the result of limiting their power of replenishing supplies of every kind. While their resources were diminishing, the opposite was the case with their enemies, whose power was developing day by day ; their ports were open, and after each defeat their armies returned numerically stronger than before. In spite of all this, Jefferson Davis never seemed able to rise to a true conception of the importance of Lee's northward advance. He never seems to have made any serious effort to provide him with adequate supplies with any haste, or to have striven to increase his army to adequate dimensions. In fact it is related that, to Lee's pressing demands for daily rations, he received a reply to the effect that he had better go to Pennsylvania to find them.

The safety of Lee's army had been gravely endangered before the Chancellorsville Campaign by the detachment of two divisions of Longstreet's Corps on a useless errand to the south ; and had Lee been kept adequately supplied, in a manner that would have enabled him to commence his advance north immediately on the return of these two divisions, he would have done so with enormous relative advantage.

Everything was favourable for an intermediate advance after Hooker's retreat from Chancellorsville. The morale of Hooker's army must have been much shattered, and their faith in their leader considerably weakened, to say the least of it, while the army itself was much weakened in numbers by the "mustering out" of time-expired men, and the troubles experienced in connection with the new recruiting laws in the Northern States.

It has been said by Northern writers that Lee was so severely handled in his actions at Chancellorsville that he was unable to move or pursue immediately after the campaign ; this is no doubt a comforting view taken up by a defeated and baffled enemy ; but scarcely reaches the truth. Lee's army was probably never more ready, and never in higher spirits or keener to come again to grips with the foe, than at that time ; and probably there was nothing but the shortness of supplies to have prevented his moving by the end of the first or the beginning of the second week in May. The Confederate

Government had had all the winter to prepare for the campaign in the spring, and it was their obvious duty to have seen that their army was provided with adequate means to assume the offensive when opportunity offered. Apparently no one in Richmond appreciated the one prime factor in the situation ; that the triumph of the South ultimately depended upon one event and one event alone ; and that the destruction of the army of the Potomac.

Throughout the war the one great fault of Federal strategy had been the perpetual striking at territories and towns as their objectives, instead of concentrating their efforts upon the main army of their enemy ; and it might appear at first sight as if Lee were falling into the same error in his advance upon the great towns of Pennsylvania. If, however, we analyse the strategical reasons for his particular line of advance we shall see that this was far from being the case.

His object in striking at the heart of Pennsylvania was to induce the Northern army to march a considerable distance from its base to give him battle ; the further he could draw them away, the greater his chance of destroying their army, especially if he could fight them on a defensive position of his own choosing. He knew that so long as he threatened the great cities of the North so long was Virginia safe from attack. On the other hand, the longer his lines of communication became the more were they open to attack, and consequently the necessity

increased of bringing the enemy to action at the earliest possible moment.

Once across the Potomac two courses were open to Lee ; the first to take the route along which he did eventually march to the northward to Chambersburg and Gettysburg ; or, secondly, to have moved along a more southerly route direct on Frederick.

On the 21st June Hooker was still on the south side of the Potomac, with his advanced troops about Leesburg, nearly thirty miles from Frederick, and three of his corps still away in the neighbourhood of Manassas. The fords of the Potomac at Shepherdstown where Lee crossed were not more than thirty miles from Frederick ; Ewell on this date was already across, and could have been in the neighbourhood of Frederick before any Federal troops could have been put there to oppose him, and had Lee decided to march by this route his army could have been concentrated in a position covering Frederick at least forty-eight hours before Hooker could have concentrated to oppose him. The position would have been of such strategic importance that Hooker must have attacked, and Lee would have had the alternative of awaiting attack in a chosen position or of defeating Hooker's Corps in detail.

Moreover, by this route his lines of communication would have been much less vulnerable, in that they would have been considerably shorter, and closed to the



enemy, as they would not have been exposed in any way to attack north of the Potomac in the same way they were along the route which he took to Chambersburg.

On the other hand, by taking the longer route to the north, Lee doubtless felt that he would gain material advantage by drawing the Federal army farther from its base ; and also that the panic caused among the citizens of the North by the presence of a hostile army in their midst would not be without its moral advantages.

Doubtless, too, he calculated on the superior marching qualities of his own army. Long marches have a wasting effect on armies, and he, no doubt, foresaw that the waste in the Federal army would be considerably greater than that in his own, which was a consideration, probably, of no little weight. It is said that Lee, whilst mapping out his campaign, had placed his finger upon Gettysburg as the point where the decisive action would probably be fought out ; whether this is absolutely true or not one cannot say ; but one thing is certain that, if at that particular moment his intention was fully made up to march *via* Chambersburg upon York, it would be highly probable that Gettysburg or its neighbourhood would be an extremely likely locality for a collision of the rival forces.

Everything worked smoothly in furtherance of Lee's plans, up to the moment at which he despatched Stuart

on his raid round the rear of the Federal army. From that period on, Lee lost the advantages which superiority in the mounted arm must always give a general; and it must seem incomprehensible to the student that the Confederate leader should have jeopardised the success of his enterprise by committing the same error by which his opponent had yielded the advantage to him in the recent campaign of Chancellorsville.

In cutting himself adrift from his cavalry, Lee sacrificed the larger portion of his power of initiative, he laid himself open to surprise, without the power of inflicting surprises upon his enemy, and above all the power of choice as to whether he would fight or decline battle.

Students of the Napoleonic wars will recall how many of Napoleon's greatest military triumphs were gained by the possession of cavalry superiority, and how his daring strategy was alone made possible by its possession.

Stuart's raid was a mistake, not on account of its rashness so much, though undoubtedly a great risk was undertaken with but little apparent advantage to be gained, but because Lee and Stuart both seemed unable to realise how essential to the success of Lee's plans was the close co-operation of his cavalry and his infantry, and that their plans in this respect failed to fit accurately as regards time and place; this may have been accidental; it is true Stuart missed Early by only a few hours;

but, all communication being lost between the main body and the cavalry, only the rarest piece of good fortune could have enabled the various units to have hit each other off at any given time or place.

To a dashing cavalry leader like Stuart, with the recollection fresh in his mind of his successful ride round the rear of McClellan's army in the previous year, such a raid offered doubtless the highest allurements; the Federal army was known to be slow, and its commander cautious to a degree and most dependent on its line of communications with the capital. To cut these communications seemed, no doubt, a sure way to still further retard its movements, and embarrass a harassed and somewhat "nervy" commander.

But Stuart's force was wholly insufficient to accomplish these objects in any full sense. He caused some alarm and confusion, no doubt, but it required more than the 5000 men which he led to shake the security of, or really embarrass the movements of, the Federal army and in no way compensated for the loss which Lee suffered by the absence of nearly two-thirds of his entire cavalry force.

Whether Lee intended in his directions to Stuart to sanction the raid in the form in which it was carried out is hardly clear. Lee's directions certainly allowed of considerable latitude. Stuart was directed to cross the Potomac with three of his brigades, and to move on

and feel the right of Ewell's troops. If Hooker's army appeared to be moving north, he was to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown; otherwise, if he thought he could do it "without hindrance," he was to pass through or around the army and cross the river between it and Washington.

These orders certainly seem to support the idea that Lee was quite prepared to allow Stuart to cut himself adrift altogether; though one cannot but think that the intention, though apparently unexpressed, must have been that some communication should still have been maintained between Stuart and himself.

Unfortunately we cannot always read intentions, and have to judge between instructions and results; and in this case probably the rapid march of events between the 26th and the 30th June, unforeseen and unexpected by Lee, and the lack of information which he possessed of the complete change of plans in the Federal army, brought about by the handing over of the command from Hooker to Meade, produced results which had not occurred to Lee when he issued his directions to Stuart.

Of the failure of Robertson to perform the necessary cavalry duties for Lee's army we have spoken elsewhere, and can only repeat what we then said, that the blame for this must rest solely upon Lee's shoulders; though Robertson undoubtedly failed to appreciate the task assigned to him, or to show any power of initiative, he

carried out to the letter the directions given him by Stuart.

The direct result of Stuart's raid, as we have already seen, was that Lee for two whole days, from the 26th to the 28th June, was absolutely in the dark as to Meade's movements; and even on the 28th, when he learned that the Federal army was across the Potomac, he had no information as to its movements, exact locality or intentions. His whole arrangements had now to be changed; and that change had to be more or less in the nature of a leap in the dark. Lee's thoughts naturally turned to his long and vulnerable line of communications; and so, to deter the enemy from advancing west to intercept them, he arrested his advance on Harrisburg, and determined to concentrate his army east of the mountains; though so far as we gather his original intention had been to operate west of South Mountain, and keep the Federal army east of it. This is fully indicated by the despatch of Early eastward to threaten Baltimore.

Up to the close of the first day's battle Lee was apparently still under the belief that his communications were the objective of the Federal commander, as he wrote on the evening of the 1st July:

"It was ascertained from prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of the army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg."

Now we knew that up to the date of Hooker's resignation, on the 26th June, it was that commander's intention to move against Lee's communications; and that with this intention, as late as the morning of the 28th, there were three of the seven corps of the Federal army in the Catoclin Valley, near Middletown, and one other at Knoxville, with the passes in the mountain well guarded; therefore probably from such information as Lee possessed, even though he was ignorant on the 28th that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, he was right in his surmise that his line of communications was the objective of the Federal army. But General Meade, on assuming command of the army on the 28th, as we know, immediately drew back these corps from the Catoclin Valley, preparatory to his advance up the east side of the mountains. Of this change of plans Lee had no intimation from any quarter until the two armies came into collision at Gettysburg. The contingency for which he was prepared never arose, and in supposing that it had, he fell into an error fraught with serious consequences. That error was due to two causes: the absence of Stuart, and the inefficiency of Robertson; and for the production of these two causes we cannot hold Lee free from blame.

We are thus afforded a distinct object lesson of the danger which attends a commander who attempts to carry on operations in the dark; what brought on the

battle of Gettysburg was not what Meade did, but what Lee supposed that he was doing.

It would be useless to indulge in speculations about what Lee would have done had he been fully informed as to Meade's movements and intentions; but we may at least presume that, had he known that Meade was advancing with three corps on the road from Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, with his remaining four corps within supporting distance to the east, he would not have passed his army over the mountains but most likely have concentrated on the western side.

One thing is certain, however, that it was the sudden change of plans, compelling the recall of Ewell's Corps, on the 28th June, which was the cause of Stuart's missing, by a few hours only, Early's division at York on the 30th June.

Once in contact with the enemy on the 1st July at Gettysburg, the tactics of the Confederate commanders were singularly slow and halting. This again was no doubt due to their lack of information, causing every movement of the enemy to take them by surprise, thus inspiring caution at a time when boldness and decision were essential to success.

Both Rodes and Heth failed in an inexplicable manner, when opposed to Doubleday's infantry, though the situation should have been quite clear to them, as it must have been evident from the first that they were in

touch with the enemy's main body. Early alone seems to have appreciated the situation and pushed his attack with the vigour that the circumstances demanded.

That evening victory lay with the Confederates; the two Federal corps, who had borne the brunt of the day, lay huddled and broken on Cemetery Hill; and, though Meade was hurrying the whole of his army to their assistance, they lay for some time at the mercy of any determined attack by the Confederate army. An opportunity offered that evening which never recurred, and yet Lee hesitated until the opportunity was gone, and the advancing columns of the North had arrived to the succour of their shattered comrades.

Early, soon after four, had sent to Lee for permission to storm the Cemetery Hill; but Lee for once erred on the side of caution. That fresh troops had arrived on the hill was certain, and he had no cavalry patrols to ascertain their strength, or to find out what forces of the enemy were marching to their relief: the Confederate troops moreover had marched far and fought hard that day; five of their nine divisions were still on the march, and two of those present were exhausted with their hard struggle, and there remained only Early's and Pender's divisions upon whom Lee could rely; so he refused and deferred further attack till the morrow.

This hesitation was fatal to Lee; and one cannot help wondering whether affairs would not have been



different had he still had Jackson at his side. The risk would have been great, but to win great successes great risks must be undertaken, and past events had shown that Lee never hesitated to take any risk when the performance was entrusted to Jackson. There is little doubt that an instant advance on Cemetery Hill that evening would have resulted in the capture of the position; and the Federal corps would probably have been flung southwards broken, disorganised and unfit for further action.

Lee's intention was to have attacked at daylight on the 2nd July; but again the opportunity was let slip—this time through the obstinacy and fractiousness of Longstreet. Early on the 2nd July Lee's army was practically all concentrated, with the exception of Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps. Of the Federal army, at the same time, there were actually on the field only the shattered remains of the I. and XI. Corps, and the XII. Corps; the II. Corps began to arrive about 7 A.M., the III. Corps about 9 A.M., the V. Corps about 8 A.M., while the VI. Corps, wearied with a long and rapid march, did not arrive until 2 P.M. The reserve artillery and the ammunition columns reached the field about 10.30.

Thus it will be observed that an attack by Lee at that time could not have been opposed by more than 15,000 troops added to the remnants of the I. and XI.

Corps, which probably numbered scarcely more, and who were much shaken by the severe action of the previous day, and would in all probability have succeeded in dislodging Meade's army from its position ; while the remaining corps would have run the risk of defeat in detail as they arrived. Yet until 4 P.M. no move was made by Lee's army !

The relations of Lee and Longstreet have been the subject of so much discussion, and the explanation of this delay has been the cause of so much crimination and recrimination, that it is unnecessary here to go into all the details of the case. The plain fact remains that the attack was delayed and the opportunity missed, and the probability is that both Lee and Longstreet were in a measure to blame. Lee's orders to Longstreet were given in the same form that Lee was wont to use in dealing with Jackson, leaving a wide discretion to his subordinate. Lee should have remembered that on this occasion he was dealing, not with Jackson, but with a man who had held different, and strongly expressed, ideas as to the conduct of the campaign to his own, and that his subordinate on this occasion was altogether out of sympathy with his purpose. His orders should have been definite and in no measure discretionary.

Longstreet, on the other hand, for whom no excuse can be made, though he felt that the force he had at hand was somewhat inadequate for the purpose, should have

pressed for more troops instead of trying to dissuade Lee from fighting. He must have seen that the strategical necessity of the situation compelled an instant offensive, and he should have zealously carried out the desires of his superior in spite of every latitude which his directions may have allowed him.

Between them the psychological moment for action was lost ; and before the attack was made in the afternoon, Meade had had ample time to consider the intentions of Lee and make every arrangement to guard against them.

The opinion held by the Federals themselves on the subject of Lee's delay is shown in the speech made by the Hon. Edward Everett of Boston on the occasion of the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery at Gettysburg not very long afterwards. He said, "I cannot but remark on the providential inaction of the Rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daybreak on the 2nd July, with the I. and the XI. Corps exhausted by battle, the III. and the XII. wearied by their forced march, and the II., V. and VI. not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster."

When the advance did commence, it was prosecuted with vigour, and continued till long after darkness set in ; but no great success was achieved through lack of co-ordination. The attacks on the Federal right and left,

it is true, took place approximately at the same time ; but in every other respect they lacked connection both in design and execution ; and on the Confederate left Ewell's efforts were frustrated entirely through failure of divisional and brigade commanders to support one another's efforts. Had Jackson been in Ewell's place the historian might in all probability have had a different tale to tell.

The same fatal tactical errors clung to the Confederate commanders on the third and last day of the battle. Lee's determination to carry the Cemetery Hill at all costs was defeated by want of co-operation among his subordinate commanders. The superiority obtained by the Confederate artillery was wasted by allowing an hour to intervene before the infantry attack commenced, and the Federal commanders, who in contradistinction to their enemies, worked as one man in affording each other mutual support, were allowed to bring up fresh troops and guns : the Confederate infantry in consequence had to advance after all effects of the previous artillery action had been nullified. Had the infantry attack been launched at the proper moment there is no certainty that it would have succeeded ; but to send it forward after an interval of grace had been allowed to the enemy was merely to send it to certain destruction.

It has been insisted that Lee should have sent forward more infantry to the support of the assaulting column :

but probably there was not infantry enough in his army to crush Meade's centre, prepared as it was, by positive knowledge of the point of attack and the interval allowed him after the cessation of the artillery action, to concentrate his forces for its protection.

A huge tactical blunder had been committed. Instead of close co-operation between the attacking infantry and artillery, two distinct actions were fought—one by artillery without infantry, and one by infantry unsupported by artillery.

Though Lee's genius seems to have been under a cloud during the three days' fighting at Gettysburg, it shone forth in its full splendour as soon as defeat was evident, and one of the most masterful performances of his career was the extrication of his army from its difficulties under the eyes of a victorious enemy and his retirement to the Potomac. In this he was ably assisted by Stuart and his indefatigable horsemen, who covered his retreat and his exposed left flank, enabling him to draw off with loss of neither men nor material; which must have made his regrets all the more poignant that for upwards of a week at the critical moment of the campaign he had deprived himself of their invaluable services.

Meade's slowness to take advantage of his victory is most incomprehensible; never was there a finer opportunity for a counter-stroke than after the defeat of Pickett's division. That Lee expected it, and viewed

its probability with something akin to alarm, is beyond a doubt. The Federal army for the time was broken, yet Meade never quitted his lines; and even on the following day, when Lee's retreat was to all appearances quite apparent, he made no move, but acted as if he considered that the Confederate retirement was merely a ruse to draw him from his defences.

This inability or incapacity to follow up a victory is observable throughout the war. The lack of finishing power was a marked feature with both the combatants, and apparently on neither side did sufficient energy ever remain with the victors after a battle to effect the destruction of their beaten enemy.

The history of the war affords us two other instances of masterly retreats on the part of Confederate commanders: Johnson from Manassas and Beauregard from Corinth; but in neither of these instances were the generals called upon to extricate a beaten army on the morrow of a heavy defeat, when still in touch with a victorious enemy; and Lee's retreat after Gettysburg stands out pre-eminently as an example of his genius and, above all, of his power of imparting confidence to all ranks under his command.

On the Federal side the defence was ably conducted once the action was fairly begun, though Meade's indecision before he was fairly committed to the fight might have led to different results had he not been ably backed

by such a man as Hancock, to whose energy and ability the defeat of Lee's attack on the centre, on the 3rd July, must be largely attributed.

As a tactical study no battle will repay close attention better, and afford more instructive lessons, than the three days' fight at Gettysburg ; pre-eminent among which are the two elementary tactical axioms, the disregard of which did so much to bring about the failure of the Confederate army : that no attack can hope to be successful if the commander fails to support his attacking columns at the right moment, and that the most important function of a general in action is to launch his reserve into the fight at the right moment.

Though his tactical failure on the field of battle was the immediate and apparent cause of Lee's disaster, the fact that the whole intention of his campaign was upset by his ignorance of the sudden change of plan, brought about by the appointment of Meade to the Federal command, was the original cause of his failure. Lee apparently intended that his strategy was to be offensive and his tactics defensive : in short, his design in drawing the enemy after him was to compel them to attack him in some strong selected position, and to have them at his mercy after they had shattered their strength and broken their spirits in vain endeavours to carry his entrenchments. As we know, events turned out otherwise, and Lee having lost the initiative was

compelled to assume the offensive rôle, contrary to his intentions.

The most striking fact of all was that his defeat at Gettysburg was due to the very mistake of principle which he had recognised so promptly, and so successfully taken advantage of, at Chancellorsville.



## APPENDIX A

ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC  
Major-General George Gordon Meade commanding

### I. CORPS

Major-General John F. Reynolds (killed)  
Subsequently Major-General Abner Doubleday

#### 1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth  
*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Solomon Meredith.  
*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler.

#### 2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General John C. Robinson  
*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul.  
*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Henry Baxter.

#### 3RD DIVISION

Major-General Abner Doubleday  
Subsequently Brigadier-General Thomas A. Rowley  
*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Thomas A. Rowley.  
*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Roy Stone.  
*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General George S. Stannard.  
*Artillery Brigade.* Colonel Charles S. Wainwright.

II. CORPS

Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock commanding

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General John C. Caldwell

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Edward E. Cross (killed).

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Patrick Kelly.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General S. K. Zook (killed).

*4th Brigade.* Colonel John R. Brooke.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General John Gibbon

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General William Harrow.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Alexander Webb.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel Norman Hall.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Alexander Hays

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Samuel S. Carroll.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Thomas A. Smyth.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel George L. Willard (killed).

*Artillery Brigade.* Captain S. G. Hazard.

III. CORPS

Major-General David S. Sickles commanding

1ST DIVISION

Major-General David Birney

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General C. K. Graham.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General S. H. Ward.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel Philip de Trobriand.

## 2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General Andrew A. Humphreys

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Joseph Carr.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel William R. Brewster.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel George C. Burling.

*Artillery Brigade.* Captain George Randolph.

## V. CORPS

Major-General George Sykes commanding

## 1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General James Barnes

*1st Brigade.* Colonel W. S. Tilton.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel S. B. Sweitzer.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel Strong Vincent (killed).

## 2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General Romayn Ayres

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Hannibal Day.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Sidney Burbank.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Weld (killed).

## 3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Wiley Crawford

*1st Brigade.* Colonel William McCandless.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Joseph Fisher.

*Artillery Brigade.* Colonel A. P. Martin.

VI. CORPS

Major-General John Sedgwick commanding

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General H. G. Wright

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General S. S. Bartlett.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General D. A. Russell.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General A. P. Howe

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel L. A. Grant.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General T. A. Neill.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Frank Wheaton

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Shaler.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel H. L. Eustis.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel David Nevin.

*Artillery Brigade.* Captain William Croft.

XI. CORPS

Major-General Oliver O. Howard commanding

Subsequently Major-General Carl Schurtz

1ST DIVISION

Major-General Francis Barlow

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Leopold von Gilsa.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Adalbert Ames.

## 2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General A. von Steinwehr

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Charles Coster.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Orlando Smith.

## 3RD DIVISION

Major-General Carl Schurtz

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General von Schimmelpfennig.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Waldimir Kryzanowski.

*Artillery Brigade.* Major Thomas Osborn.

## XII. CORPS

Brigadier-General Alphœus Williams commanding

## 1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Thomas Roger

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Archibald McDougall.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Lockwood.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel Silas Colgrove.

## 2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General John D. Geary

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Charles Candy.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel George Cobham.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General George Greene.

*Artillery Brigade.* Lieutenant Muhlenberg.

CAVALRY CORPS

Major-General Stoneman commanding  
Subsequently Major-General Alfred Pleasanton

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General John Buford

*1st Brigade.* Colonel Gamble.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Thomas Devin.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Wesley Messitt.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg

*1st Brigade.* Colonel McIntosh.

*2nd Brigade.* Colonel Pennock Hury.

*3rd Brigade.* Colonel S. I. Gregg.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick.

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Farnsworth.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General George Custer.

HORSE ARTILLERY

*1st Brigade.* Captain S. M. Robertson.

*2nd Brigade.* Captain John, C. Tidball.

ARTILLERY RESERVE

Brigadier-General R. O. Tyler

## APPENDIX B

### ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

General Robert E. Lee commanding

#### I. CORPS

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet commanding

#### 1ST DIVISION

Major-General J. B. Hood

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Anderson.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Jenkins.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Laws.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson.

#### 2ND DIVISION

Major-General La Fayette McLaws

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Barksdale (killed).
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Kershaw.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Woffard.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Benning.

## 178 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG

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### 3RD DIVISION

Major-General E. Pickett

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Kemper.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Armistead (killed.)
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Garnett.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General R. Toombs.
- 5th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Corse.

### II. Corps

Lieutenant-General Jackson (killed)

Subsequently Lieutenant-General Richard Ewell

### 1ST DIVISION

Major-General Jubal Early

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Smith.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Hoke.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Hays.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Gordon.

### 2ND DIVISION

Major-General Edward Johnson

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Jones.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General James Walker.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General George Stuart.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General F. J. Nicholls.



## 3RD DIVISION

Major-General R. S. Rodes

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General E. A. Neal.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Ramseur.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General George Doles.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Alfred Iverson.
- 5th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Junius Daniel.

## III. CORPS

Lieutenant-General Ambrose P. Hill commanding

## 1ST DIVISION

Major-General R. H. Anderson

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General William Mahone.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Wright.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Perry.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Canot Posey.
- 5th Brigade.* Brigadier-General C. M. Wilcox.

## 2ND DIVISION

Major-General Pender (killed)

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General McGowan.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Thomas.
- 3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Lane.
- 4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Scales.

3RD DIVISION

Major-General Heth

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Archer.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Pettigrew (killed).

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Charles Field.

*4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Cook.

CAVALRY DIVISION

Major-General James E. B. Stuart commanding

*1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Robertson.

*2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Wade Hampton.

*3rd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Fitzhugh Lee.

*4th Brigade.* Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee, subsequently Brigadier-General Chambers.

*5th Brigade.* Brigadier-General W. E. Jones.

*6th Brigade.* Brigadier-General A. G. Jenkins.

*7th Brigade.* Brigadier-General Imboden.

ARTILLERY

Colonel Lindsay Walker commanding

## APPENDIX C

### FULL TEXT OF GENERAL STUART'S INSTRUCTION TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL B. H. ROBERTSON<sup>1</sup>

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF NORTHERN  
VIRGINIA

*June 24, 1863.*

To Brigadier-General B. H. ROBERTSON.

GENERAL,—Your own and General Jones' brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself as senior officer, being in command.

Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our designs, and to harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy. After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear. As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant General Longstreet, or myself, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah

<sup>1</sup> From "Century War Papers," Part 19.

by Charlestown to the Potomac. If, in contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley clear of what pertains to the army and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it. You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown. I send instructions for General Jones which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses and to marching off of the turnpikes. In case of an advance of the enemy you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions, and, if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the gaps. In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.

You will have with the two brigades, two batteries of horse artillery. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART.

*Major-General commanding*

Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.

## APPENDIX D

### LOSSES AT CHANCELLORSVILLE <sup>1</sup>

#### FEDERAL ARMY

I.	Corps, Reynolds	.	135
II.	„ Couch	.	1,925
III.	„ Sickles	.	4,119
V.	„ Meade	.	700
VI.	„ Sedgwick	.	4,590
XI.	„ Howard	.	2,412
XII.	„ Slocum	.	2,822
	Cavalry	.	141
			<hr/>
Total			16,844

#### CONFEDERATE ARMY

Hill	.	.	.	.	2,583
Rodes	.	.	.	.	2,178
Colston	.	.	.	.	1,868
Early	.	.	.	.	851
Anderson	.	.	.	.	1,180
McLaws	.	.	.	.	1,379
Artillery	.	.	.	.	227
Cavalry	.	.	.	.	11
Prisoners (estimated)	.	.	.	.	2,000
					<hr/>

Total      12,277

<sup>1</sup> From "Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War."

## APPENDIX E

### LOSSES AT GETTYSBURG

The losses at Gettysburg are given by the Comte de Paris as :

#### FEDERAL ARMY

Killed	.	2,834
Wounded	.	13,709
Missing	.	6,643
		<hr/>
Total		23,186

#### CONFEDERATE ARMY

Killed	.	2,665
Wounded	.	12,599
Missing	.	7,464
		<hr/>
Total		22,728

## APPENDIX F

Description of "Stonewall" Jackson, taken from "Battle Fields of the South," by an English combatant:

"Stonewall may be a very fine old gentleman, and an honest, good-tempered, industrious man, but I should admire him much more in a state of rest than continually seeing him moving in the front. And such a dry old stick, too! As for uniform he has none—his wardrobe isn't worth a dollar, and his horse is quite in keeping, being a poor lean animal of little spirit or activity. And don't he keep his aides moving about! Thirty miles' ride at night through the mud is nothing of a job; and if they don't come up to time, I'd as soon face the devil, for Jackson takes no excuses when duty is on hand. He is about thirty-five years old, of medium height, strongly built, solemn and thoughtful, speaks but little and always in a calm, decided tone; and from what he says there is no appeal, for he seems to know every hole and corner of this valley as if he made it, or, at least, as if it had been designed for his own use. He knows all the distances, all the roads, even to cowpaths through the woods, and goat-tracks along the hills. He sits his horse very awkwardly, although generally speaking, all Virginians are fine horsemen, and has a fashion of holding his head very high, and chin up, as if searching for something skywards; yet although you can

never see his eyes for the cap-peak drawn down over them, nothing escapes his observation.

“His movements are sudden and unaccountable; his staff don't pretend to keep up with him, and consequently he is frequently seen alone poking about in all sorts of holes and corners, at all times of day and night. I have frequently seen him approach in the dead of night and enter into conversation with a sentinel, and ride off through the darkness without saying, ‘God bless you,’ or anything civil to the officers. The consequence is, that the officers are scared, and the men love him.”



## APPENDIX G

### HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

#### GENERAL ORDER No. 61

" With deep regret the Commanding-General announces the death of Lieutenant-General F. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th inst at 3.15 P.M.

The daring, skill and energy of this great and good soldier by the decree of an all-wise Providence are now lost to us. But while we mourn his death we feel that his spirit still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defence of our loved country."

R. E. LEE,  
*General.*

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